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ABSTRACT
A case study of the Brookline, Massachusetts Department of Rent
Control from an institutional analysis point of view reveals that
to an overwhelming degree rent control policy and practice are set
by an organization's system of administrative review. The case covers
the period 1970 to 1980, a decade of growing inflation during which
many of the nation's municipalities adopted what is known as Moderate
Rent Control, a policy designed to pass costs along to tenants and to
guarantee landlords a "fair" rate of return which can be adjusted due
to changes in economic circumstances. In Brookline, Moderate Rent
Control was accompanied by a highly articulated system of due process
administrative review, capable of handling individual rent adjustment
petitions in great detail from both the landlord's and his tenants'
point of view.
Analysis of the Brookline case is preceded by a theoretical dis-
cussion of where in its legal history rent control developed many of
its present day due process features./ Sherman, Niles, and Zussman,
leading cases on due process issues and administrative review, decided
by the Massachusetts courts in 1975, 1976, and 1977 respectively, lo'cate
final authority with local rent control boards for making rent adjustment
decisions and for providing adequate due process protection to the reg-
ulated. These cases point the way for analysis of Brookline's system
of administrative review, selected to illustrate how a "best case" of
Moderate Rent Control administration behaves over time.
The conclusion of the thesis is that a highly articulated, due
process system of administrative review contains inherent conflicts
which frustrate the achievement of Moderate Rent Control policy goals.
The time consuming nature of the process of administrative review
creates delay, case overload, and backlog. The ultimate organizational
response is dysfunction, symptoms of which are inability to deliver
timely rent adjustment decisions and economically valuable rent adjust-
ments to landlords. The organization is caught in a position of having
to continually "catch up." The most likely remedy for the problems
caused by a due process system of administrative review are changes in
the system itself. The thesis proposes ways to streamline an ample due
process system, such as Brookline's, and the consequences for subsequent
rent control policy and practice.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor of Urban Studies
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INTRODUCTION
The Problem
Rent control is a highly controversial topic whose merits are
frequently argued as if it were a dichotomous issue in which only
irreconcilable pro or con positions exist. My initial motivation
for this thesis was curiosity over whether one might examine rent
control, a by now familiar form of price regulation of the private
housing market 1, without being drawn ineluctably towards one or
the other pole, i.e. rent control or no rent control. The task
of examining rent control regulation was viewed as compelling
because rent control represents the only instance of price regula-
tion of private housing in the United States. In one form or
another, we have tolerated it for over seventy years.
The Approach
This thesis takes an organizational analysis approach to rent
control, attempting to steer a nonaligned course towards its re-
search goal and not take sides in a "rent control-no rent control"
.2
debate. By 'analysis' we shall mean the following
"the resolution or separation of the reference system (that
which is modelled) into its parts to illustrate their nature
and interrelationships and to determine general principles
of behavior."
Organizational analysis will involve developing a model of a typical
rent control administration. By 'model' we shall mean a synthesis,
a putting together of these general principles observed in the
3
reference system.
One of the most pronounced general principles in a contemporary
rent control organization is the principle of procedural and
substantive fairness, what is known as "due process." The meaning
of the principle of due process as it applies to administrative re-
view derives from the legal definition of due process. Substantive
due process refers to protection by law to persons from arbitrary
and unreasonable action; procedural due process concerns the rights
of parties affected by rules to be notified and to be heard.4 Hence
our model of rent control administrative review will focus on those
procedures designed to protect and preserve substantive and procedural
due process rights of the regulated. We shall call it the Due Process
Model.
We shall also develop a model of contemporary rent control policy.
Rent control policy since 1970 has been a legal framework for moderating
the rate of rental housing price increase in an inflationary setting.
This form of rent control attempts to set a "fair" rent by balancing
5landlord and tenant economic interests. Known as Moderate Rent Control,
this policy acknowledges landlord entitlement to a profit and in support
of that premise allows cost pass throughs to tenants and adjustments
in the landlord's rate of return on his property. The goals of
Moderate Rent Control as stated in our rent control policy model are
complemented by a due process system of administrative review, which
procedurally balances landlord and tenant interests.
Defining a "fair" rent and administering procedural rules of
due process administrative review to achieve procedural "fairness"
are the time consuming heart of the principalset of responsibil-
ities of a rent control agency. All disputes about substantive or
procedural "fairness" must be resolved via the Due Process model.
Participants in a Due Process organizational model accept that
achievement of procedural fairness guarantees a "fair" decision.
To this extent, if the Due Process model is observed, all disputing
parties are compelled by the model to be satisfied of the equity of
the decision at hand. It is perhaps one of the ironies of the Due
Process model that has the ability to "compel" acceptance: both
parties understand that any decision will represent a compromise
between their respective positions, and therefore they recognize
the Due Process model guarantees a predictable compromise, the
balancing of landlord and tenant economic interests. This compro-
mise is preferable to both parties to a model which would require
larger losses from either side.
We are indeed suggesting that the Due Process model and the
Moderate Rent Control model complement one another in that they
both strive for substantive and procedural fairness. Earlier we
noted that a formal model is not a theory, but rather, a synthesis.
Nonetheless, a single theory, such as the notion of fairness em-
bodied in both Moderate Rent control and Due Process models may
be used "by many different kinds of models." 6
A model of the due process features of administrative practice
applies to many kinds of regulatory agencies. Indeed, the due pro-
cess model of administrative behavior is deeply rooted in our legal
tradition. At all levels of judicial review, the due process
standard has been consistently applied to all forms of government
regulation of private enterprise. Rent control is no exception.
The legal due process requirements of moderate rent control to
a large part determine the features we find in both the Due Process
model and the Moderate Rent Control model.
Thus, Chapter One of this thesis will prepare the groundwork
for understanding the legal due process issues of rent control
policy and administrative procedure. This groundwork is prepara-
tion for development in Chapters Two and Three of the Due Process
model and the Moderate Rent Control policy model. The legal history
of rent control enables us to unearth major policy elements of a
rent control model, quite apart from due process concerns or from
contemporary housing market behavior theories. A legal history of
rent control reveals that rent control predates the modern state.7
Chapter Two will develop our model of rent control administration,
the Due Process model. Our model of both a typical rent control
agency and of moderate rent control will be analyzed for their con-
tribution to a definition of substantive and procedural "fairness."
Analysis will suggest that the Moderate Rent Control policy model
predictably implies the Due Process administrative model.
Chapter Three will present a typical, and by that we mean a
generally successful, rent control agency administering moderate
rent control. Our subject will be the Brookline, Massachusetts
Rent Control Department and Rent Control Board. We shall focus
on how the Rent Control Board makes "fair" rent adjustment decisions.
In many ways Brookline's Rent Control Department reflects Weber's
notion of the "pure type of legal authority with employment of a
bureaucratic administrative staff."8 For Brookline's Rent Control
Department, in its almost eleven years of operation, displays the
features which Weber confidently suggests recommend a bureaucratic
form of administration9: high degrees of efficiency, precision,
stability, strict discipline in adhering to administrative rules,
and reliability. One of the outstanding features, according to
Weber, of a well functioning bureaucratic administration is its
"particularly high degree of calculability of results for the head
of the organization and for those acting in relation to it."10 By
most reports, the Brookline Rent Control Board and the administrative
department measure up to these Weberian criteria. In this regard,
we might say that Brookline represents a "best" case. In the course
of discussion we shall also refer to the experiences of the Boston,
Massachusetts Rent Control Department and Rent Control Board.
Boston's experiences provide a counterpoint to those in Brookline,
and provide examples of a stripped down Due Process model which is
struggling under the administrative pressures created by due process
concerns in making rent adjustment decisions.
Chapter Four is predictive. An argument will be made for the
inherent tendencies of the Due Process model to overload, that is,
to create such a volume of case work for the rent control department
and rent control board, that backlogs and inefficiency result. We
shall discuss the affects of overload on Weber's bureaucratic
standards, noted above. In suggesting ways in which the Due
Process model might be altered to reduce overload we shall be
making the final claim that the Due Process model might be replaced.
If the Due Process model is replaced by an administrative model which
better handles caseload, the provocative question arises: What effect
will this have on substantive rent control policy? Our last claim is
that as the Due Process model gives way under administrative pressures
for change, such as politically mandated budget cuts, and overload,
a model of rent control policy other than the current Moderate Rent
Control policy model will accompany the administrative model which
takes its place.
NOTES
1. At its peak since reintroduction in 1970, rent control has
been enacted in 232 localities. Lett, Rent Control, p.72-73.
2. Greenberger, et al., Models in the Policy Process, p.4 9
3. ibid., p.49 .
4. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th edition.
5. Gilderbloom, Moderate Rent Control.
6. Greenberger, et al., p. 49.
7. Willis, "A Short History of Rent Control."
8. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, p.329
9. ibid., p. 337.
10. ibid., p. 337.
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Chapter One: A LEGAL HIS'IORY OF RENT CONTROL
1A LEGAL HISTORY OF RENT CONTROL
Understanding the legal requisites of rent control provides a
basis for any analysis of rent control policy because these legal
requisites are necessary limits within which policy has been drawn.
This chapter will present a brief history of rent control in order
to sketch these limits for the reader to illustrate how the limits
are in some instances dynamic.
The legal history of rent control is the history of court de-
cisions on particular rent control laws. Thus, the organization
of the chapter will respect the hierarchy of the courts: U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions will be reviewed first, for they set the final
standards of judicial review of rent control. Massachusetts Supreme,
Superior, Appeals, and Municipal court decisions will also be
reviewed, especially for their contribution to administrative issues
of rent control. In fact, state court decisions provide the only
guidance to rent control administrative review questions, as the
last U.S. Supreme Court decision on rent control was in 19481 and
it was a landmark decision on the question of entitlement to a fair
return.
The focus of Chapter One is on the development of substantive
and procedural elements of rent control due to court decisions.
The history is selective therefore, and places considerable empha-
sis on the relationship of these decisions to our Due Process
model of rent control administration and the Moderate Rent Control
policy model.
Origins of Rent Control Laws
It is surprising how far back in history one has to look to find
the origins of rent control laws. The Roman Pope Paul IV with the
1555 bull of Cum Nimis Absurdum put in force prohibitions against the
Jews of owning property, engaging in commerce, and most significantly,
living among Christians. Authorities in each city under papal rule
were ordered to set aside one quarter to be walled about to which all
Jews were to be confined. This is the origin of the ghetto. Jews
were forced to be tenants, and Christian landlords engaged in gross
profiteering due to their monopoly. In 1562, Pope Pius IV lifted
some of the prohibitions against the Jews, and ordered the Papal
Chamberlain to fix rents after which they could not be increased.
Pope Clement VIII, in 1604 issued new rent controls which deprived
owners of houses in the ghetto of the right to increase rents or to
evict. Tenants from 1604 on gained the right to remain in their
homes in perpetuo. These later controls occurred after the Pope
had banished all Jews in the Papal state except from Rome, Ancona,
and Avignon. Rent controls were a response to overcrowding and
tenant hardship which occurred in these three cities. This historical
beginning is consistent with later grounds for invoking rent control:
monopoly ownership, overcrowding, and the desire of the state to
"protect" a class of citizens who rent ' housing. Emergency housing
conditions created by wartime emergency stimulated rent controls
in succeeding centuries throughout the European continent.
Rent Control in the United States
In the United States the history of rent control begins with the
twentieth century. Rent control can be said to have evolved from a
First Generation which began with World War I, through an inter-
mediate stage which was largely dictated by federal policy in the
Federal Housing and Rent Acts commencing in 1947 and concluding in
1950, and thence into a Second Generation which began in 1970 and
continues with much local variation and discretion today. The
standards of judicial review of rent control have evolved as well as
the policy itself.
I. First Generation Rent Controls and the Supreme Court
The first instance of general5 rent control in the United States
came in 1919, towards the end of World War I as the nation's industrial
centers were straining to meet wartime production needs. These rent
controls, which we shall call "First Generation" rent control policy,
were in essence price freezes: they imposed freeze dates, price
ceilings, and eviction controls upon landlords. These first sets
of controls were initiated by local citizens committees acting with-
out the power of legal enforcement. The voluntary efforts focused
political attention upon widespread rent gouging and profiteering by
private landlords in the nation's industrial centers. The behavior
of landlords was causing disruption in local labor pools, as
workers migrated from one industrial center to another in search of
work and affordable housing. High labor turnover rates had begun to
be regarded by government and industry alike as a threat to the
national welfare. In fact, the federal Bureau of Industrial Housing
and Transportation had supported formation of local citizens' com-
mittees to review landlord-tenant disputes, in pursuance of its ef-
forts to coordinate industry and resources for the war effort. At
least eighty communities developed voluntary citizens committees to
review rent and eviction disputes.
Formal, that is, legal First Generation rent control measures
were enacted in the industrial northeast, by New York and the District
of Columbia. Landlords immediately challenged these price controls
in court, alleging that they deprived property owners of economic
substantive due process. Landlords invoked the Due Process clauses
of the United Stated Constitution, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution are
embodied in the Fifth Amendment which pertains to the federal
government and the Fourteenth Amendment which protects persons from
state actions. Substantive due process rights imply protection to
persons from arbitrary and unreasonable action. Procedural due pro-
cess rights involve the rights of parties affected by rules to be
heard and to be notified.6 Within these general notions of due
process, however, exist the potential for court interpretation of
what literally constitutes due process rights. The court's doctrine
of economic substantive due process represents an initial reaction
to government regulation of private, formerly unregulated enterprise.
Economic substantive due process was a concept which prevailed
at the turn of the century, just prior to the birth of First Generation
rent controls. Landlords asserted that freedom of contract, which
included the freedom to set rents and to evict was a component of
economic substantive due process. They claimed that state inter-
vention in the form of regulation of rents interferred arbitrarily,
unreasonably and contrary to constitutionally protected due process
rights to enjoy private property and to conduct business. Earlier
economic substantive due process claims involved the regulation of
industries which the courts identified as legitimately regulated
because of an existing monopoly and a public interest. Court respect
for property rights rested on the premise that a legislature does not
have unlimited power to regulate prices. Legal historians have noted
that the post-Civil War rise of industrial capitalism "was character-
ized by a strong business pressure on the courts to limit government
regulation" and that the Fourteenth Amendment became a rallying point
for those resisting government regulation of the growing industrial
economy. Hence, court approval of regulation was infrequent. The
doctrine of economic substantive due process protected most private
enterprise from government regulation.
There was one notable exception to Supreme Court rejection of
legislative attempts to regulate private industry, and that was
Justice Holmes' 1905 dissent in Lochner v. New York. The majority
opinion struck down as unconstitutional a New York statute to limit
the work week of bakers, claiming that the law had failed the
reasonable relationship test: there was no relationship, the
majority opined, between the quality of bread or of worker health,
and the number of hours worked! In the absence of that relationship
between a policy and its goal, the court held that regulation violated
due process rights. In his celebrated dissent, Justice Holmes wrote8 :
"The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics... a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez
faire."
Nonetheless, rent control challenges were based on the then prevailing
view that the constitution entitled property owners to enjoyment of
their property, without the interference of government regulation, i.e.
economic substantive due process; that no public interest was at stake.
Yet in early challenges to the constitutionality of New York and
District of Columbia rent control laws the Supreme Court developed
another doctrine, known as the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
The majority opinion pointed out that in some exceptional circum-
stances use of the police power to protect the public interest was
justified. The Supreme Court decided that early New York and District
of Columbia rent controls were constitutional based on the exceptional
circumstances doctrine: it made no reference to Lochner in its
opinions. They defined World War I as the exceptional circumstance
which justified imposition of price regulation on private housing.
Rent control was therefore upheld as constitutional.
World War I was relied upon as the exceptional circumstance which
established the constitutionality of other rent controls statutes, as
well. The war emergency provided the legal requisite for validiation
of the rent control law. In subsequent Supreme Court decisions, the
definition of a war emergency insofar as it created a housing emergency
was further developed. Thus the court clarified its position that the
successful imposition of rent controls relied upon a dire emergency.
A series of U.S. Supreme Court opinions known as the "Rent Laws"
followed from April, 1921 through April, 1924. The Court elaborated
its exceptional circumstance standard for valid rent control to
include the legislative proviso that rent controls would be a tem-
porary response to a war generated housing emergency. This was a
statement of the Court's housing emergency requirement for valid
rent control.
At the state level, however, the New York Supreme Court was
willing to go further than the exceptional circumstance grounds
for approving rent control. Justice Pound wrote in 1921 that,
"Even in the absence of an emergency, the state may pass wholesome
and proper laws to regulate the use of private property."9 He
reasoned that the police power could be used to regulate business
in the public interest and that this did not violate private
property rights. He was in fact rebutting the economic substantive
due process claim. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, was willing
to approve New York's rent control only on the basis of an exceptional
circumstance and of its temporary nature. The U.S. Supreme Court had
not yet rejected the concept of economic substantive due process.
Justice Holmes of the N.Y. Supreme Court argued in his minority
consenting opinion that housing was a "necessity of life" and that
"all of the elements of a public interest justifying some degree of
public control are present."10 This statement was a milestone. The
doctrine of economic substantive due process had been chipped.
Although World War I ended in 1919, municipalities continued
as late as 1924 to claim a war generated housing emergency as the
legal basis for enacting rent control. In Chastleton v. Sinclair the
U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that it would challenge legislative
jdugement and would now scrutinize legislative findings of housing
emergency conditions whenever necessary. Thus landlords challenging
rent control had acquired another claim against rent control: that
the legislative statement of emergency was inaccurate. From 1924
until 1934, during the Taft Court, rent control faced an unsympathetic
Supreme Court. Decisions were handed down which firmly restated the
doctrine of economic substantive due process, during what has been
called the "high tide of economic substantive due process."
In 1934 the landmark Nebbia v. New York firmly introduced the
reasonable relationship test to court scrutiny of rent control. Sub-
sequent challenges to the constitutional validity of rent control
based on economic due process were rejected, the court instead using
the reasonable relationship test.12 The U.S. Supreme Court tested
rent control laws on the basis of their reasonably responding to
their goal, the relief of a war generated housing emergency. Because
the Court was loathe to interfere with legislative judgement, as long
as it could be argued that rent controls bore a "reasonable relation-
ship" to the goal of relieving the housing crisis, the Court would
approve them. The claim of economic substantive due process techni-
cally met its end here.
The next logical place for opponents to attack rent control was
in the accuracy of legislative statements of a war generated housing
emergency. Certainly by 1934, World War I had become history. But
before this challenge could be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court,
World War II erupted. Rent controls were revived nationally, this
time at the federal level under the authority of the 1942 Emergency
Price Control Act.
The preceding year, 1941, FDR had instructed the Office of Price
Administration (OPA) to develop programs with the obejctive of sta-
bilizing rents nationwide. OPA organized over 210 communities in
creating fair rent committees 13, similar to those of World War I,
without legal power of enforcement. But the 1942 Emergency Price
Control Act introduced vigor into rent control. The federal law
designated "defense rental areas," and by 1945 among cities with
a population over 100,000 only Scranton, Pennsylvania failed to
put in place rent control.14 All local controls were supplanted
by the OPA rules. New York City enacted rent control to supplement
new OPA rules. The rent controls were price ceilings but did not
include intricate formulas for making adjustments.
The last challenge to rent control to reach the U.S. Supreme Court
came in 1948 with Woods v. Cloyd B. Miller Co. The Court upheld the
constitutionality of federal review of federal rent controls. Question
had again been raised about the constitutionality of public inter-
vention in private housing markets and entitlement of landlords to
an equitable return on their investment. Landlords were complaining
of their inability under federal rent controls to earn a fair rate
of return on their property, a denial of their due process rights.
Substantial Congressional discussion occurred on whether price
ceilings of First Generation type rent controls ought not be replaced
with a system whereby a "fair" return on a starting base was guaran-
teed.15 From locality to locality, OPA standards for passing through
costs and operating expenses differed, the only constant threshhold
being that landlord return had to be set high enough to avoid
confiscation. The U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in 1948 that
landlords must not as a rule be forced out of business due to rent
control levels of return that were confiscatory. Yet rent control
was upheld in 1948. The national debate raged over the distinction
between a legal return as set out in Woods as the legal minimum
rate necessary to stay in operation, even if some landlords were
injured by it; and landlords' accustomed market levels of economic
16
return.
II. The Transition Period for First Generation Rent Control, 1947-1950.
By 1947 rental housing was one of the few segments of the national
economy still subejct to price regulations.17 With the enactment in
1947 of the federal Housing and Rent Act, however, federal controls
were gradually terminated and authority transferred to state and local
rent control agencies. President Truman signed the Act reluctantly18
criticizing it for affording tenants too little protection: rent
control had received strong challenges in Congress from landlord
interests and the Act was a response to that pressure. The Act
contained numerous exemptions from rent control. New construction was
exempted, hotels, and housing not rented between 1945 and 1947, this
last an attempt to bring back housing which had been kept off of the
market by landlords who refused to submit to rent controls. This
number was estimated by the OPA to be from 500,000 to 1,000,000 units!
Luxury accomodations were also exempted from federal rent controls.
The federal Housing Expeditor was empowered to adjust "fair rents"
to levels of comparable units elsewhere, and to grant 15% per year
adjustments. This 15% increase was contingent upon the landlord
entering into a two year lease with his tenant, through 1948. The
Act did not only concern setting rent increases. It also affected
the role of the courts in judicial review of rent control. During
the Price Control Act, only the Emergency Court of Appeals had been
empowered to hear complaints about the legality of regulations
issued and administered under the EPC Act. Rent control was in
1947 only again eligible for regular judicial scrutiny. The 1947
Housing and Rent Act expired February 29, 1948.
As we have noted, the Supreme Court did uphold the validity of
rent control in two challenges which followed the provisions of the
1947 Act. But Congress was relinquishing its major, protective role,
as it issued legislation in 1948 and in 1949 to continue the transfer
of rent control authority to lower levels of government. Sentiments
in Congress ran high against rent control. The Property Owners
Council of Nashville, Tennessee gave some of the more colorful
comments inserted in the Congressional Record by Representative
19
Rich of Pennsylvania . The Property Owners Council denounced rent
control: "Because it is arbitrary and unprincipled and unbusinesslike.
Because it makes demagogues out of politicians and parasites out of
tenants. Because it gives more money to the tenants to buy whiskey,
to gamble, and to throw to the wind."19
The Concept of Fair Net Operating Income
But Congress persevered and introduced a new formula for
determining rents, to be used by local boards in making their
decisions. The formula could be used at the discretion of local
boards to replace existing price ceilings and intricate adjustment
criteria for passing through some costs, etc. In 1949 the new
federal adjustment formula was defined as a Fair Net Operating
Income (FNOI) formula. A FNOI was defined as a return equal to a
percentage of gross rent receipts. Prior to this formula, state and
local rent control boards had been using an assessed capital value
formula as the criterion for adjusting rents above the price ceiling.
Landlords were given a percentage return on what the board determined
the capital value of the property to be.
The capital value method had been unwieldy and inconsistent,
as differences in opinion over value abounded, and because properties
continued to change value with vagories in housing market behavior.
Congress was attempting with the FNOI formula to resolve questions
landlords frequently raised in court, as in Woods, over what con-
stituted a fair return, where the legal threshhold of confiscation
was set, and how to determine an economic standard of return.
Landlords charged that the arbitrariness of local board behavior
deprived them unjustly of private property and violated their
due process rights.
Rent controls continued into the early 1950's with this FNOI
formula as well as with the capital value method. State and local
legislation continued to include boilerplate declarations of a
housing emergency due to the exigencies of war, to avoid due process
challenges. The Korean conflict was cited as the relevant war. Court
challenges to rent control at the state level continued on the basis
of rent control depriving landlords of a fair return. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court summarily accepted the findings of the Massachusetts
legislature which tied the extension of rent control to the continua-
tion of a housing crisis caused by war, thus accepting the war
emergency standard in justifying the use of the police power to regu-
late rents.20 Other state courts followed suit. The judgements of
local rent control hearing boards in their determinations of FNOI
were acceptable to the courts. Due process challenges to rent
control on the basis of the regulations' being arbitrary, unreasonable,
or unrelated to a policy goal made no headway in knocking out the law.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear rent control cases.
In Brookline, Massachusetts a local rent control statute was
drafted under Massachusetts St. 1953, c.434, enacted in 1953 as a re-
placement to federal law, and designed to terminate in 1955. The ob-
ject of c.434 in its own language was "to relieve the shortage of
residential household accomodations... and by gradually relieving the
emergency" to contribute to a normal housing market.21 Upon its
termination in 1955 as planned, a tenant sued the Brooklien Rent
Control Board22 claiming that her landlord had raised rents beyond
her ability to pay and that she was owed protection from the Brookline
Rent Control Board. The court found for the Rent Control Board, accept-
ing Brookline's decision to terminate rent control, stating unequiv-
ocally that c. 434's purpose "is not to create vested rights." 2 3
In all municipalities except for New York City, rent control
lapsed with the expiration of federal rent control laws from the
mid-fifties until the end of the sixties. In New York, under
special adjustments, exemptions, and extensions of the law, rent
control had continued unabated from 1919. Buildings all over the
city fell under different rent rates due to controls. Landlords
were receiving inconsistent and inadequate levels of return to
operate successfully. This was also true at the state level. But
the experiences of New York City are especially unique. Yet despite
their uniqueness, the disasterous New York experience hangs like a
spectre over rent control's reputation.
III. Second Generation Rent Control and Massachusetts State Courts
Decisions
The first break with the legislative tradition of basing rent
control on a war related housing emergency came in 1969 with
Brookline, Massachusetts' local rent control initiative, which
declared a housing crisis as its emergency condition. Although the
Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected Brookline's initiative on the
grounds that the town lacked local authority to invoke the police
power, and thereby invoke rent control 24, the following year the
court let stand state enabling legislation which also sounded an
alarum over a housing crisis grounded in lack of low and moderate
income housing and hardship to tenants due to an overheated market.25
Boston enacted rent control the following year, as well as the metro-
politan municipalities Brookline, Cambridge, Somerville, and Lynn,
Massachusetts.
A second suit brought a year later by Marshal. House, Inc.
against the Brookline Rent Board26 lays out the basic challenges
to this era of rent controls, and highlights those features of
rent control beginning in the 1970's which distinguishes it as
"Second Generation"27 rent control.
Second Generation rent control is primarily concerned with
moderating peaks in an "over-heated" housing market with the pre-
sumption that the market can and will, in the near future, return
to normal, i.e., market equilibrium in which tenants can negotiate
rents with landlords. The principal feature is the FNOI concept
and pass through of costs to tenants.
Although most of our attention is focused on Massachusetts law,
standard sections in Second Generation rent control legislation are:
1.EMERGENCY DECLARATION:
A "boilerplate" declaration of emergency which identifies the basis
upon which the state is exercising its police power, a basis first
challenged by the doctrine of economic substantive due process,
later this challenge being modified although not definitively
layed to rest.
2.EXEMPTIONS:
Exemptions of certain structures, such as owner occupied dwellings
or luxury housing. At most, approximately 50% of the housing stock
falls under the jurisdiction of a typical rent control statute.
3.ROLLBACKS:
Rent rollbacks to a date prior to the proposed legislation for the
purpose of setting a base, "fair market rent." Increases are
computed on this base, which is presumed to give the landlord a
fair net operating income. The rollback date is designed to avoid
incorporating post-enactment inflated rents in the base.
4. FAIR NET OPERATING INCOME(FNOI) MECHANISM:
A FNOI mechanism or guidelines for setting a "fair" rent. The
FNOI refers not to market rates of economic return, but to an
agency determined legal rate of return. A "fair" rent is one
which, derived from the FNOI mechanism, represents a balance of
landlord and tenant economic interests.
5. EVICTION CONTROLS:
Eviction controls to protect tenants against landlords evicting
them to avoid rent control rules and to raise rents. Often the
legal maximum rent is unchangeable regardless of wheter the land-
lord has a new tenant. Tenants are protected against harassment.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES:
Rules governing rent control administration, such as the estab-
lishment of a hearing board to hear landlord and tenant complaints,
a staff to compute rent increases, methods of funding the agency,
etc. Much discretion exists in this section, especially in
Massachusetts law. The rules follow the paradigm of state admin-
istrative procedure and thereby meet due process standards of
judicial review. These rules form the core of what we are calling
the Due Process model. (See Introduction, p.2)
The Marshal House case will illustrate typical legal challenges
to points 1.-5. above of Second Generation rent control. Point 6. will
be discussed separately. Let us take the legal challenges in Marshal
in the order of the generic features listed above.
1. EMERGENCY DECLARATION:
In its emergency preamble, St. 1970, c.842 stated that the purpose
of the Massachusetts act was "to alleviate the severe shortage of
rental housing in the commonwealth" and that "a serious public emer-
gency exists with respect to housing" especially in cities or towns
with a population over 50,000. Brookline, in its own St. 1970, c.843
which authorizes the town of Brookline to adopt rent control, stresses
in its declaration of emergency "abnormally high rents... the expanding
student population... a substantial elderly population" and other
features, which are not specified in St. 1970, c.842. The court
sanctioned Brookline's specific emergency features as well as its
inclusion of all dwellings under rent control, noting that it was
" a constitutionally sound path to solve the town's unique situation."
Nationwide, beginning in 1969, there was a resurgence of rent
control initiatives against what one legal expert calls a "backdrop
of uncertainty as to the vitality of the emergency standard and the
absence of any clear judicial definition of what constituted a
housing emergency."29 A variety of emergency standards now exist
in rent control legislation, all inserted to safeguard the legis-
lation against due process challenges. Four elements of the
emergency most frequently cited are: a housing shortage detrimental
to the health, safety and general welfare of residents: excessive
rent increases; and hardship to tenants. (See Table 1.) Four states
refer to the vacancy rate as the trigger mechanism for rent control,
in New York the level being set at 5%. No state actually documents
housing price conditions, sets specific base rents, or otherwise
documents the housing emergency empirically. Certainly no claims
have been made based on tenant ability to pay.
2. EXEMPTIONS:
Municipalities were allowed under St. 1970, c. 842 sect. 3(b)(7) to
exempt rental units for which rents exceed limits set by the municipal-
ity, provided that no more than 25% of the housing stock is exempted.
Both this exemption and the 50,000 population minimum for eligible towns
were challenged as denying equal protection, but the court decided that
the challenge was invalid, that rent control did require flexibility
due to local differences. The court agreed that retn control did re-
quire local discretion, that discretion was both necessary and desirable.
3. ROLLBACKS:
The rollback provision of St. 1970, c.842 states that under
rent control the first legally maximum rents shall be "that rent
charged the occupant for the month six months prior to the accept-
ance" of the act by the municipality, in order to avoid incorporating
inflated rents into the maximum initial base rent. The court
rejected30 claims that this would "violate the constitutional guaran-
tees of equal protection of the law and due process of law"' because
the effective rollback date would vary in accepting municipalities.
Again, the court stressed local differences existed and therefore
with it the need for legislative flexibility and local discretion.
4. FAIR NET OPERATING INCOME (FNOI) MECHANISM:
St. 1970, c. 842 required that individual or general rent level
adjustments "may be made in accepting municipalities so as to yield
landlords a 'fair net operating income'. " It contained other
provisions empowering accepting localities to administer their own
rent control "fairly to both landlords and tenants." Landlords
cahllenged these sections as denying them equal protection and due
process of law. The guidelines were indeed very general.
The justices pointed out that these predictable attacks on
St. 1970, c.842's term "fair net operating income" and on the
rollback provision are31
"levied on the face of the statute and by-law involved. None of
the plaintiffs has introduced any evidence that the operation
of either will necessarily be confiscatory with respect to him
individually or with respect to a general class of landlords...
Any landlord in the future who feels that they are being applied
to him in a way which deprives him of a fair return on his
investment is free to pursue his grievance in the courts after
having exhausted the procedures provided in both c.842 and
art. XXX for adjustment of re75s and judicial review of orders
of the board or administrator ."
The court would not take challenges on the mere face of the statute's
FNOI procedure. It demanded unsatisfactory landlord regulatory ex-
perience as evidence of a complaint. The court said that the land-
lord must first submit a claim to the rent control board. Only
afterwards could he appeal on due process grounds to the state court.
The court reiterated its reliance on local hearing board jurisdiction
and on the validity of local rent control board adjustment procedure
as the source of due process protection (to landlords and tenants) by
stating at footnote 12 (above),
"There is no constitutional infirmity in the fact... that the
extensive procedures for adjustment follow and do not precede
such an application."
The burden of proof falls squarely on the landlord in proving to
the rent board, first, that is has deprived him of a "fair return."
The language of St. 1970, c.842 and 843 in regard to the adjust-
ment of maximum rents makes a single interpretation difficult. Six
relevant factors in determining a rent which yields the landlord
a fair net operating income are spelled out, "among others," in c.842.
These six factors to be considered "among others" are: changes in
property tax; unavoidable increases or decreases in operating and
maintenance expenses; capital improvement of the unit; changes in
living space, services, furniture,etc. ; substantial deterioration
of the unit other than as a result of ordinary wear and tear; and
failure to perform ordinary repair.
Brookline's c.843, Section 3 also uses the term "fair net
operating income" as its standard of adjustment but employs different
language:
"that income which will yield a return, after all reasonable
operating expenses, on the fair market value of the property
equal to the debt service rate generally available from insti-
tutional first mortgage lenders or such other rate of return
as the board, on the basis of evidence presented before it,
deems more appropriate to the circumstances of the case."
Referring to their initial review of c.84232, the court reiterated
that rents should be set high enough "so as to assure to landlords
a reasonable return on their investment." This section of c.842
has been the greatest source of confusion and disagreement between
courts, landlords, and in some cases, rent board directors and their
staff over what is "reasonable" and what is a "fair return."
Yet the court stood behind the principle that "every presumption
is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a legislative enactment." 3 3
This view takes in exemptions contained in c.842 and c.843, as well
as the means for arriving at the board's determination of a FNOI,
"as long as there are possible findings which the Legislature could
reasonably have made in the legitimate exercise of the police power
its acts will be upheld."3 4
Underscoring the negotiator role of the rent control board in
arriving at its own means for determining a FNOI and for making
individual determinations, the court wrote35
"The effect of all these provisions is to empower municipalities
to administer their own rent control according to a mechanism
which is carefully designed to insure fairness to both land-
lords and tenants."
In sanguine fashion, the judges opined36
"The flexibility which c.842 allows to each community to mold
the term "fair net operating income" to accord with its
peculiar local needs is a desirable feature of the act."
The combination of the presumption of validity given to legislative
enactments and confidence in agency administrative discretion are a
powerful judicial bulwark to the local agency in making FNOI determin-
ations. These rulings keep most decisions within the agency domain,
rather than allowing them to migrate into the courtroom.
5. EVICTION CONTROLS:
Marshal House did not directly challenge eviction controls.
The court, however, expressed its support for them in maintaining
the efficacy of rent controls to protect tenants in an overheated
housing market.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES:
Not surprisingly, landlords sued over dissatisfaction with rent
board decisions, questioning the criteria used by the rent control
board in arriving at the FNOI in their particular case. In 1975, an
important decision was handed down on the subject of administrative
review. The decision focused attention on the due process mechanisms
of the Brookline Rent Control Board. The decision also illumined the
court's evolving view that fair decisions on FNOI disputes were
strongly linked to administrative practice, even more than on
empirical economic standards for resolving the dispute over what
constitutes a "fair net operating income." This bifurcation in
views of landlords and the Massachusetts Supreme Court mirrors
the 1940's debate over the difference between an economic versus
a legal fair rate of return, although in the 1940's the legal rate
imposed a price ceiling.
In Sherman37 decided in 1975 in favor of the Brookline Rent Control
Board on the question of its authority to hold a hearing on a deter-
mination of FNOI, evaluate the evidence, and then decide, without
the decision being reversible upon judicial review. The plaintiff
had asked the court for a hearing of his case de novo, effectively
requesting a rehearing before the courts of what had been heard before
the Rent Control Board. The court rejected the request, emphasizing
that the role of the court was to "review the record made before the
Board."
The court "digressed" to examine the process of rent adjustment
envisaged in c.842 so as to contribute to its interpretation locally.
First, the court focused on sect. 8(a) which requires local boards
to furnish a "trial-type" procedure, with adequate notice or hearing
if requested.38 The Board, it explained, is required to follow the
State Administrative Procedures Act39 on adjudicatory proceedings be-
fore agencies. Especially important, it noted, are the rights of the
parties to "call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and intro-
duce other evidence, and to have an official record maintained."4 0
These are the basic elements of what we are calling the Due Process
model. ( See Introduction, p.7)
The court addressed the claim of ambiguity in the FNOI mechanism,
which the plaintiff claimed clouded what was specifically meant by
a "fair return." Again giving substantial discretion and authority
to local rent boards, the court wrote41
"The setting of maximum rents may indeed be expected to involve
a mathematical" process, but the foregoing shows that there
are discretionary elements, to which may be added the discre-
tion allowed a board by sect. 7(d) to refuse any rent increase,
or any decrease,...."
Returning to the question of administrative review, the bench
defined what today remains the prevailing doctrine of the court's
role in reviewing local rent adjustment decisions. It wrote42
"the court's proper role is not to take evidence afresh and
decide for itself what rent is to be fixed, but is rather
to decide whether the board's decision was supported by the
facts before it and was legally justified." (emphasis added)
Landlord and tenant due process rights thus derive protection from
local administrative process. The court accepted the exceptions to
the rules of administrative procedure to which rent control c. 842
was treated. The opinion presciently noted,"Very likely the excep-
tions were intended to relieve a board of a burden in the many
routine cases where there would be no thought of possible review." 4 3
Furthermore, the court noted that in rent cases put to the court
for final review, the agency might offer reasons on the record under-
lying its decisions, although the court did not require such an ex-
planation. The purpose of the board supplying a written explanation of
its decision,"even if not required by c.30A, subsidiary facts upon
which it relies(sic) tend to ensure administrative justice and to
encourage public confidence in the administrative process."44 In
Sherman the Massachusetts court took the position which, while
acknowledging the impossibility of strict duplication in a local rent
control board of state administrative procedure because of the threat
of overloading the rent board, insisted on keeping the full intensity
of appeal and review within the arena of the rent board itself. This
intensity posed its own challenges to local boards, even though the
court was supportive in its tending in a direction which granted
local, administrative review of rent decisions.
In 1976 Massachusetts enabling legislation c. 842 expired and
it was up to the discretion of localities to renew rent control.
Brookline adopted Article 38 under Town authority as its rent
control bylaw from 1975 on. Brookline drafted its own admin-
istrative regulations, which "directly affects the spirit and
nature of interpretation and enforcement of the legislative mandate
for rent control." 4 5
The most significant state level court decisions on administrative
review of rent control are Zussman46 and Niles decided in 1976 and
1977, respectively. They focus on administrative rules and discretion.
Both of these cases reinforce interpreting c.842's phrase "fair return"
in the context of administrative rules for a procedurally "fair" process.
Zussman appealed the Brookline Rent Control Board for an
increase in rents on his twenty-six units, purchased in 1972 for
$ 700,000 with 100% financing at 9%. He stated that his intentions
were to converst them to condominiums. The Board granted an increase
which represented a 6.8% return. As 6.8% was less than his 9% debt
service he appealed the Brookline Board's decision in the courts.
A Superior Court judge found that the Board's rate was confiscatory,
and that 10% was indeed a reasonable rate. He remanded the case to the
Board to compute allowable rents based on a 10% return. The tenants
appealed to the Massachusetts Appeals court. The Appeals Court re-
manded the case to the Superior Court for review according to
Sherman. Again the Superior Court reviewed the case, the judJge
agreeing that 6.8% was confiscatory on the facts of the case but
also holding that there was no evidence to support a finding of
"a constitutional entitlement to a 10% rate of return" 4 8 even given
evidence to support its being reasonable. In explanation of its
decision, the court referred to the Sherman opinion as its standard:
"We reaffirm that decision today and specifically hold that a
landlord who asserts that confiscation of his property has re-
sulted from a decision under St. 1970, c. 842 sect. 8(a), is
not entitled to a trial de novo."
The Court did not reject the due process right to judicial review
in rent control administrative review. But it closely defined the
role of the courts in this review process. The opinion reiterated
that the "effect of this opinion is to limit the power of the reviewing
court in substituting its own evidentiary hearing for that already
conducted by the rent control board."49
Thus the local rent board, in this instance Brookline, was assured of
the authority and finality of its rent adjustment decisions.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court also revealed its bias in Zussman.
The opinion chastised the landlord for paying so high a price for the
building50
"the plaintiff purchased the property with the intention of con-
verting it to condominiums. This factor may have made him
willing to pay a higher price for the building. In any case, the
protection against confiscatory rates applies only to those who
conduct their operations in a reasonably efficient manner."
In a gesture in support of rent control and the Brookline Board, the
.51
opinion continues,
"Where the actual purchase price exceeds the fair market value of
the units as apartments, the rent control board would be abdicat-
ing its duty if it granted an increase in rates to cover the
excess cost."
Caveat emptor!
Niles, decided in 1977, involved a claim against the Boston Rent
Control Board in regard to its method of arriving at a FNOI. In
Niles the court addressed itself to administrative discretion as it
related to an agecny following its own regulations. Boston Rent
Control Regulation 6 sets out the FNOI mechanism for adjusting rents.
Regulation 6 is essentially a cost pass through mechanism. It presumes
that rents charged for December, 1971 which are the legal maximum
rents based on 1970 rollback date market rents, "yielded more or
less than a fair net operating income."52 The court noted in its
description of the facts that5 3
"In addition to the calculation under Reg.6, the administrator
began the practice, following a decision by the Housing Court
of the City of Boston requiring a fair return on a fair market
value, of also performing an analysis based on that standard
as a check on the other calculation, on the theory that a
fair return on fair market value is required by c.842's
requirement of a fair net operating income. The practice
of using such a criterion has not been incorporated into
any regulation." (emphasis added)
This case is specifically concerned with an agency following its
stated rules of procedural fairness in determining a "fair" rent.
The plaintiff charged that a November, 1975 and August, 1975 rent
adjustment did not allow him a FNOI. The court issued two opinions,
one in reference to each Boston Rent Control Board decision.
The court examined the claim that the November, 1975 rent ad-
justment was unfair by looking at the standards of judicial review
of rent adjustments by local boards. Niles had argued that he
was entitled to a fair return on market value. The court disagreed,
citing Sherman and referring to the language of c.842:
"Statute 1970, c.842,s.7 requires that rents be established at
levels which yield to landlords a "fair net operating income."
This is different than the landlord's contention here that,
'St. 1970, c.842,and perhaps the Federal and State Constitu-
tion, requires that owners be permiteed a reasonable return
on the fair market value of their property.' "'
The court cited Marshal. House and Zussman in pointing out that the
constitutionally approved interpretation of c.842 required that
rents be set "So as to assure to landlords a reasonable return on
investment."54 and that where investment "exceeded fair market
value, rents based on fair market value were not confiscatory."55
The opinion reiterated56 that Federal case law57 does not establish
that,
"a fair return on the fair market value of property is required
by the United States Constitution. To the contrary... maximum
rents which were in general fair and equitable but which in
individual cases might prevent a landlord from earning a fair
return on the fair market value of the property was constitu-
tional.
The circularity of basing rents on the fair market value was
58
pointed out5. The court noted that if rents are based on the fair
market value of the property, and this value is based on the rents
received, the rent setting process is circular. They cited the
discussion of circularity in a New Jersey case 59. There the court
explained how relying upon fair market value frustrated the
objectives of rent control, by incorporating the inflated price of
the "failure ridden" housing market. The New Jersey opinion said
that reference to the fair market value of a property involves the
rent board in an erroneous judgement of what constitutes a confis-
catory rent, because the reference to fair market value made the
process circular, as fair market value is a function of gross rent.
The New Jersey court compared rent regulation to utility rate
setting, and made note of Justice Brandeis' distinction in utility
rate setting matters. He distinguished between public rate setting
and setting the exchange value of property. He reasoned that
establishment of a fair return in either case served different
functions: "the thing devoted by the investor to the public use is
not specific property, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked
in the enterprise." New Jersey courts allowed landlords a return
on capital "prudently invested" and not on the exchange value of the
invested capital, i.e. fair market value.
The court in Niles rejected his claim that the legal maximum
rent of November, 1975 was not a FNOI. It pointed out that Boston
Regulation 6,s.4 provides a mechanism for overcoming the presumption
that December, 1971 rollback date rents produced a FNOI. Niles did
not attempt to do this, nor establish that subsequent changes made the
1971 "base year" return unfair. Thus, in the court's view, Niles
failed to show that the 1975 adjustment - which relied upon 1971 rates
of return - was not a fair return.
More importantly from an administrative point of view, however,
was the court's statement on the Boston Administrator's August, 1975
decision. In August, the Administrator had relied upon a fair market
value method of determining the FNOI. He claimed that it was an
"interpretation of Reg.6 and as such does not require formal amend-
ment to be incorporated into the regulations." The Court disagreed.
It said that the Administrator did not put this "gloss" on Regulation 6
from the inception of the regulation, but only after the Boston
Housing Court's decision in M.E. Goldberg. Hence, the bottom line
of judicial review became the following60
"Where an administrative agency changes its interpretation of a
statute or regulation based on a court decision which is later
held to be incorrect, its interpretation is not considered as
having persuasive force."
This leaves the Massachusetts court doctrine of administrative
review as follows. As long as the agency has observed its own rules
in reviewing the evidence put before it by the petitioner in making
its decisions, that decision will stand before the court. The
court will not provide a forum for a new hearing, in place of the
initial rent board hearing. It will not consider evidence anew and
prepare a new record. The court will review the record established by
the local board.
Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Sherman, Zussman, and Niles
noted the relationship between a process which obeyed rules of
administrative procedure in compliance with due process standards
of review and of a "fair" decision. A "fair" decision on FNOI was
seen to be one which followed the agency rules, barring, of course,
the landlord's successful claim that the agency decision made it
impossible for "an efficient operator to stay in business or derive
any profit whatever."61 A procedurally fair process was seen to
yield an equitable rent. As we have observed from the language of
c. 842 and c.843 substantial local rent control board discretion typifies
the determination of what constitutes a FNOI.
CONCLUSION
Thus the legal history of rent control, from First Generation price
ceilings to Second Generation FNOI rent regulation bring our attention
to the internal workings of a local rent control agency and its board.
The law has evolved, and the standards of judicial review of rent
control, such that a local rent control board has considerable author-
ity and flexibility in all but its basic rules of administrative practice.
These, of course, are modelled on state laws of administration.
We need to look more closely at these administrative rules to
discover how rent control is delivered. If the substantive issues of
rent control have been settled in the courts, the procedural issues
might yet offer a continuing target for suits and controversy. This
suggestion reflects our observation that administrative rules have
much to do with the nature of policy delivered.
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The purpose of Chapter Two is to draw a model, by which we
mean a generic statement, of Second Generation rent control. The
model will serve as the basis for further discussion of the affects
of procedural rules on the nature of rent control policy delivered.
We are most concerned with how a Second Generation rent control ad-
ministration makes "fair " rent decisions. We shall generate a rent
control policy model based on observation of how the Brookline and
Boston, Massachusetts rent control administrations employ their
respective FNOI devices.
The second half of this chapter will be taken up with developing
an administrative model, which we shall call the Due Process model.
The Due Process model accompanies the policy model. The administra-
tive model is again drawn from observations of the Brookline and
Boston, Massachusetts rent control administrations. We shall dis-
cuss how the organizational model complements the policy model.
Each defines features of the other.
Drawing upon our discussion from Chapter One, we shall again
observe that legal due process requirements have to a great extent
been responsible for the inclusion in both the Second Generation
rent control policy model and the administrative model of basic
principles of organizational behavior. The most noteworthy general
principle, of course, is the principle of operating in such a way
that the regulatory system delivers "fairness" to landlord and tenant.
Moderate Rent Control
Second Generation rent control policy's primary concern is
determining a regulated but profitable rent in an ongoing process
of rent adjustments by the local rent control board of private
landlord rents. As we noted earlier, First Generation rent control
was a system of price ceilings, with very little room for adjustment.
Second Generation rent control's policy goal of controlling the
rate of rent increase while at the same time guaranteeing a
profitable rent, a "fair" rent, to the landlord has led to its
being called Moderate Rent Control. We shall refer to it as such.
The name Moderate Rent Control is suggestive of two moderating roles
embodied in the general policy. First, this form of rent control
attempts to moderate the rate of price increase of rental housing;
second, this policy plays a moderating role between the economic
interests of landlords and tenants.
Moderate rent control has set itself a difficult task. For it
attempts to balance landlord and tenant economic interests, which
by definition conflict. Moderate rent control defines landlord
interests as the requirement of a profit, what in its terminology
is called a "fair return". It defines tenant interests as the
desire to stabilize rent expenditures for a given level of housing
services. This desire is especially difficult to realize in
inflationary periods, such as the present.
General Principles and Creating a Model
Our definition of a model is that it is synthesized from general
principles of behavior, of an organization, of a policy, of whatever.
Moderate rent control displays a small set of general principles,
which we can easily identify.
A first principle is that the invisible hand is presumed to
have set an equitable rent. This principle comes into play in
that the base in year one upon which rent adjustments are made does
rely upon historic market rents. This base is presumed to
represent a fair net operating income, that is, to be equitable.
The burden of proof that the base rent is not "fair" rests with
either the landlord or the tenant, who must document special
circumstances.
A second principle is that the moderate rent control agency
can adjust this "fair" rent as needed and reset the level of
fair net operating income established in the base year. The tool,
either conceptual or mechanical for determining subsequent "fair"
rents is the Fair Net Operating Income (FNOI) concept. The FNOI
concept is applied on a case by case basis to make rent adjust-
ments after the base year to acecotnt for economic changes since
the base year and this is said to represent a "fair" rent.
We use italics around the word 'fair' to denote that this
term has a special meaning. "Fair" denotes an equitable rent
insofar as a moderate rent control agency is concerned, given
its legislative underpinnings and mandate. We are not relying
upon colloquial connotations of the word 'fair'. For given the
legislative imperative that a moderate rent control agency employ
a Fair Net Operating Income concept, what else can one generate but
a "fair" rent? Technically speaking, a "fair" represents a series
of computations based on rent received in the base year; and it
represents the shifting, legal outline of that middle ground be-
tween landlord and tenant interests.
A third general principle of moderate rent control derives from
the FNOI concept. This third principle is that the landlord is en-
titled to pass through most of his operating costs to the tenant.
These costs are composed of such items such as fuel, maintenance,
and capital improvements; as well as of public charges, such as
real estate taxes. A "fair" rent under a moderate rent control
policy has built into it flexibility to rise with operating cost
increases, due either to inflation or increased housing services.
We have spoken several times already of the "balancing role"
between landlord and tenant economic interests that a moderate rent
control policy serves. Certainly these three general principles
which when synthesized constitute the core of a moderate rent
control policy model determine where the fulcrum in the balancing
mechanism is placed. The balancing mechanism is embodied in the
moderate rent control policy model in two forms. The first is
in a formal rule ,the legislative requirement that the rent control
board use a fair net operating income method of setting rent increases,
or decreases, at its discretion. The second form is in the due
process requirements of the legislative enactment of rent control:
the requirement that regulated parties are protected from arbitray
and unreasonable state action. Hence, the rent control laws include
provisions for hearings at which either landlord or tenant can pre-
sent evidence in support of his claim for a particular rent adjustment.
This second form of balancing mechanism is embodied in both the rent
control agency organizational structure: a rent control board provides
a forum for trial-type hearings. And it is embodied in administrative
rules, rules which either amplify or streamline the due process features
of the rent setting process, i.e. full, - hearings versus
closed door sessions; testimony from witnesses versus affidavits;
audits of landlord expense records and inspections of dwellings,
versus spot checks.
Thus we can make claim that the three general principles of a
moderate rent control policy model tip the "balance" in the favor
of landord interests: he is, after all, guaranteed a "fair" return
based on historic market rents. Yet the administrative rules
which vary so much among administrations calibrate the scales,too.
The balance can be altered by amplifying or streamlining due process
procedural devices, such as the availability of full hearings.
This theme we shall develop further in drawing the Due Process
model of moderate rent control. But let us commence by drawing a
moderate rent control policy model.
PART 1:
A Policy Model of Moderate Rent Control
A policy model of moderate rent control can be drawn in more
than one way. Unlike zoning, for example, no universalizable
model code exists for moderate rent control. Blumberg, a rent
4
control law expert suggests that this is so because lawmakers
recognize the extreme local variety in housing conditions, political
factors, and governmental capacity. He believes5 that universal ap-
plication of a model moderate rent control law would be impossible
for these local differences.
Our policy model, which is synthesized from existing laws and
general principles, is therefore a modest one. The model will be
derived primarily from Brookline and Boston rent control laws, and
will be used as a basis for comparing the two sets of laws. Later,
our Moderate Rent Control model will be coupled with an administrative
model.
The Moderate Rent Control model will be composed of three
components. These components group general principles which
establish: the nature of legal and political legitimacy; the
nature of substantive regulatory policy; and the nature of local
procedural rules. As we noted earlier, "A formal model is not a
theory, although it may represent or embody theory in its con-
struction."6 The three components of our model reflect basic
theories which motivate the model's behavior.
I. Legal and Political Legitimacy
As the twentieth century organizational theorist Max Weber
7instructs , any system of authority, such as a rent control
administration, must establish its legitimacy as an order such
that those whom it attempts to exercise authority over respond
according to the behavioral rules. In his seminal work, Weber
described four principal ways in which an order acquires legitimacy
for those acting subject to it: (a) tradition; (b) affectual
attitudes; (c) rational belief in its absolute value; (d) because
it has been established in a manner which is recognized to be legal. 8
Of course, our political order is recognized as legitimate because
it has been established in a manner which is recognized to be
legal. Rent control, as we have shown in Chapter One, as part of
a legal order, must demonstrate its adherence to legal authority.
Legality itself, according to Weber's classification system,
can be treated as a legitimate order in either of two ways9:
"on the one hand it may derive from a voluntary agreement of the
interested parties... (or).. .it may be imposed on the basis of
what is held to be a legitimate authority over the relevant
persons."
This distinction points to the challenge facing moderate rent control,
which is an imposed legal order on a special class of citizens,
private landlords. Rent control must justify singling out one class
of citizens who have voluntarily accepted a larger legal order in
the belief that it is rational and equitable to all citizens.
A moderate rent control policy model therefore naturally includes
elements which describe its source of authority, the nature of that
authority, and reasons for "relevant persons" to accept the imposed
authority. The elements selected to establish an imposed legal
authority have profound consequences for the regulated parties,
here landlords and tenants. As Weber perceptively notes,10
"The legitimacy of a system of authority has far more than a
merely 'ideal' significance, if only because it has very def-
inite relations to the legitimacy of property."
Certainly landlords recognize the existence of a direct relationship
between rent control's source of legitimacy, and the legitimacy of
their property claims. Hence, too, a moderate rent control policy
carefully fashions its claim to legal legitimacy knowing that the
claim does affect the legitimacy of property, an established legal
order as well. Our model of moderate rent control thus includes a
particular theory of private property.
A statement of how a moderate rent control policy model would
establish legal and political legitimacy among those regulated by
it might look as follows:
LEGAL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY MODEL
A. Housing emergency declaration in order to invoke the police power,
and respect the larger legal order.
B. Definition of the rent control administration as a neutral ground
for resolving landlord and tenant rent "disputes" and for setting
an equitable rent, here defined as a "fair" rent.
C. Acknowledgement that landlords are entitled to a "fair return"
which is defined in terms of market rates of return on capital.
D. Definition of a "fair return" and a "fair" rent as the rent set
by the marketplace, prior to imposition of rent control. This
becomes the base upon which rent adjustments are then calculated.
E. Calculation of rent adjustments at the request of landlords and
tenants, and not only at the discretion of the rent control
authority.
F. Definition of legal and nonlegal rents, legal rents being only
those established by the rent control authority which it calls
'"maximum legal rents" and which are also "fair" rents.
Principles A. through F. each play a role in establishing the
legitimacy of an imposed legal authority. A. acknowledges the
larger legal order. B. defines the new imposed legal order as an
arbiter of equity out of respect for established definitions of
the legitimacy of property. C. confronts the sticky question of
how an order imposes authority upon only property owners yet
simultaneously asserts its legitimacy in a way destructive to
the legitimacy of their property claim. The answer is this rent
control reduces profit levels moderately, but within acceptable bounds.
D. also acknowledges the dilemma of a legal order imposing two
conflicting theories of the legitimacy of property claims, and
attempts to moderate the conflict by compromise. E. assumes that
participation in the rent adjustment process by the regulated, and
especially landlords is a counter measure to the order's having been
imposed. Participation offer landlords a chance to "state their
case." F. is the ultimate assertion of the administration's legal
authority. This principle establishes the rent control agency in
a position just short of a market maker: yet it "legitimizes" the
rents allowed to rise and fall on the swell of market behavior.
Indeed the nature of the legitimacy of property claims has
changed for both landlords and tenants, under this component of the
model. Tenants have acquired an indirect claim on property, a right
represented by the law taking on their interests and regulating the
rate of increase of rents to a maximum legal rent. However, as we
noted in Chapter One 11, moderate rent control does not created vested
rights. Landlords have lost some property, albeit temporarily. But
many landlords accept the authority of rent control. We can only
presume that its bite out of their profit margins is acceptable.
II. Substantive Regulatory Policy
Depending upon the kind of legal authority claimed, the mode
of exercising authority differs. In an imposed legal order, laws
must define equitable rules. Those responding to the rules see the
rules as valid only insofar as they maintain an established notion
of the legitimacy of property and hence equity. Our moderate rent
control policy model must demonstrate the validity of its rules
primarily to landlords. The most noteworthy principle is embodied
in the rent adjustment rule, the FNOI concept. The established
legitimacy of property is challenged by the FNOI concept.
A model of general principles of substantive policy could read
as follows:
SUBSTANTIVE REGULATORY POLICY MODEL
A. A trigger mechanism turns the rent control system "on," during
the housing emergency, and "off" when the emergency dissipates.
B. Definition of the regulatory field, i.e. partial or total reg-
ulation of the housing stock.
1. Establishment of a threshhold year, after which date new
construction is exempt from rent controls. This is to
encourage new construction to ease the housing crisis.
2. Exemption of owner occupied dwellings, where rental does
not occur.
3. Exemptions, in some instances, of owner occupied two, three,
or four unit structures in deference to the "non-professional"
nature of most small real estate owners and to their numbers.
4. Definition and exemption of certain classes of dwellings,
such as "luxury" units which rent at the top of the market.
C. Rent adjustment standards, embodying a FNOI concept. The FNOI
concept can be expressed in guidelines (Version I); or as a
mechanical formula, (Version II).
Version I: Guidelines (derived from Brookline Rent Control Regulations)
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Standards for Rent Adjustment: 1970
The Board shall presume that rents for March 1970 were established at
levels which yielded to owners a fair net operating income, and
shall grant increases or decrease in rents if it finds that there
have been since March of 1970: (1) property tax increases; (2) un-
avoidable operating expense increases;(3)capital improvements;(4)
changes in housing services; (5) substantial deterioration of the
unit;(6)failure to perform ordinary repair and maintenance.
The Board is empowered to adjust rents upward or downward among others,
to yield a rate of return "on the basis of evidence presented before
it, deems more appropriate to the circumstances of the case."
Net Operating Income Guidelines: 1976
(Note:a Up until 1975 Brookline had employed a formula whereby net
operating income was a return equal to 6-11% of property
value as established on the rent rollback date. Property
value was originally established by official assessments.
Later, five standards were considered: the purchase price,
if within 3 years; an appraiser's estimate, landlord testi-1 4mony; a 5.5 gross income multiplier; 1.45 x assessed value. )
Section 6: (a) The rent board shall make such individual or general ad-
justments, either upward or downward, of the maximum rent for any con-
trolled rental unit... as may be necessary to assure that rents for con-
trolled units are established at levels which yield to landlords a
fair net operating income for such units... (b) The following factors,
among other relevant factors, which the board by regulation may define,
shall be considered in determining whether a rental unit yields a fair
net operating income: (1) through (6) above.
(Note:b These guidelines afford discretion to rent control administrative
staff. They can examine the quality of housing services provided,
the nature of repairs and improvements, and the efficiency of
a-.property operator in determining whether operating costs are
legitimate. The level of costs will determine the net operating
income. Informal calculations are made by the Rent Control
Board, based on property value, using guidelines explained in
the Note above, but since Niles cannot be used as the formal
grounds for determining a FNOI. The FNOI determination is a
composite, and can vary from case to case.)
Version II: Formula (derived from Boston Rent Control Regulations)
Standards for Rent Adjustment:15
The Administrator shall presume that rents charged for December 1971
yielded a fair net operating income for December 1971 and... shall use
such rents in computing adjustments and establishing maximum rents...
This presumption may be overcome by evidence tending to show that the
rents charged for December 1971 yielded more or less than a fair net
operating income for December 1971. The burden of proving that the
rent yielded less than a fair net operating income shall be on the
landlord and the burden of proving that the rent yielded more than a
fair net operating income shall be on the tenant. 16
The board shall, by order or regulation as provided in section 6,
make such individual or general adjustments, either upward or down-
ward, of the maximum rent...shall observe the principle of maintaining
maximum rents for housing accomodations at levels which will yield to
landlords a fair net operating income... 17
In determining whether the maximum rent for housing...yields a fair
net operating income, the board shall consider the following among
other relevant factors:
(Note: same as in Version 1, p.53)
Net Operating Income Guidelines:18
Among factors that shall be considered relative in determining whether
the rents charged for December 1971 ...yielded more or less than a
fair net operating income from the building for December 1971 are:
(1) the fact if proved, that the net operating income of the building
for 1971, measured as a percentage of gross income was:
A. more than 50% or less than 35% in the case of any building the
construction of which was completed on or after January 1, 1960.
B. more than 40% or less than 25% in the case of any other building
containing more than six controlled rental units, or
C. more than 35% or less than 20% in the case of any other building
containing six controlled rental units or less.
(2) the fact, if proved, that 1971 property taxes, measured as a
percentage of gross income were
A. less than 30%, or
Version II: Formula (derived from Boston Rent Regulations), continued
B. more than 35% to the extent that such taxes were not abated
and are not currently subject to abatement.
(3) through (7) which require that the landlord prove that capital
improvements were made which are not reflected in the rent, that
tax increases and unavoidable expenses were incurred in 1971 that
are not reflected in the rent, and "any other factors tending to
show that gross inequity and extreme hardship will result to the
landlord or to the tenancs if the rents charged for December 1971." 20
The quantitative rules are strictly applied, making the rent
adjustment process relatively mechanical. 21
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D. Kinds of rent adjustments.
1. General annual adjustments: an automatic, annual rent increase
granted by the agency to all landlords in compliance with the
law. General adjustments are prepared by rent control staff
based on average cost increases in categories such as fuel,etc.
See Tables 3 and 12B for Brookline and Boston general adjust-
ments, respectively.
2. Special, individual adjustments decided on a case by case
basis at the initiation of the landlord or the tenant.
Special adjustments may be instead of or in addition to
general adjustments. See Tables 3 and 8 for Brookline.
See Table 12B for Boston.
3. Hardship special adjustments, due to unforeseen circumstances.
E. Automatic cost pass throughs. As long as landlords properly doc-
ment operating costs, taxes, etc. the board will pass these costs
through to the tenant. Discretion is applied on how much of a
cost increase is to be absorbed by tenants.
F. Legal authority to compel compliance with agency rules. Foremost
among these rules is registration of property to establish the
base year fair net operating income. Rent adjustment rules are
the substantive thrust of moderate rent control. Rules covering
property use itself, in the form of Brookline's condominium con-
version moratorium, also occur.
G. Eviction controls, designed to protect tenants against harassment
by landlords resentful of controlled rents and desirous of emptying
the unit to avoid rent control.
With these rules, a moderate rent control policy model established
the nature of substantive policy. Principles A. and B. are self-
explanatory. The balancing principle established in rule C. shows
a definite tilt in favor of the landlord, in that he is guaranteed
a rate of return originally set by market forces. This rate of
return is presumed to be "fair" by the agency and should be valid
in the eyes of the landlord, if only because the level of return is
one he himself set in an unregulated market. Should a landlord not
agree that the return is "fair" a rule exists to permit him to
prove his case. The validity of the rule should be upheld by its al-
lowing the "relevant person" to take advantage of its flexibility
towards exceptional cases or errors. In Brookline, we see that
the use of principle D., the general annual automatic adjustment,
is yet another attempt to preserve the equity of the system by
granting all landlords a general rent adjustment upwards, requiring
no burden of "proof" on their part. The general adjustment is used
as a tool for keeping pace with inflation. Rule E. reflects the
moderate rent control policy's "moderating" nature in regard to
balancing landlord and tenant economic interests. Rule E. does
not permit a landlord to take advantage of a tight housing market
by raising his rate of return, but does allow pass through of cost
increases, due in part to inflation and basic price increases.
The last two rules, F. and G. are translations of the way in
which a moderate rent control policy exercises its authority. Rule
F. organizes the regulatory field by requiring property registration
by the relevant parties, the"regulated" and by permitting non-
registration of landlords exempt from rent controls. Eviction
controls, rule G. are extended to tenants of "regulated" landlords,
to protect them from harassment. Presumably, eviction controls are
designed to preserve the place of tenants in the regulatory field,
by offering them extra safeguards to ensure they will not be removed
to unregulated housing. These two last principles select the two
groups whose interests the moderate rent control policy balances.
These are the two principle groups who must accept the rules as valid.
Other classes of owners and tenants are outside of the system.
III. Procedural and Administrative Rules
The principle of administrative rules developed to guarantee
our policy model's mode of exercising authority is a bureaucratic
one. The theory of behavior of a rent control "order" must be a
theory of the behavior of a bureaucracy and those it serves. Weber
wrote that a "pure type" of legal authority with employment of a
bureaucratic staff rested on acceptance of certain premises. First,
that any legal norm can be established by agreement on grounds of
expediency or rational values, or both. And second, that2 2
'"every body of law consists essentially in a consistent system
of abstract rules which have normally been intentionally
established... administration of law is held to consist in the
application of these rules to particular cases; the administra-
tive process (is).. .pursuit of the interests which are specified
in the governing order."
For Weber, the recommending feature of a bureaucracy was its efficiency
and its nredictability: "It thus makes possible a particularly high
degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization
and for those acting in relation to it."23 Moderate rent control
administrative rules employ a bureaucracy. This fact implies that
"fair" rent decisions should be predictable, both from the rent
control agency's point of view and from that of landlords and tenants.
Our sketch of rules of administrative procedure for a moderate
rent control policy model relies on the principles of efficiency
and consistent application on a case by case basis of rules to
particular cases: we will question if these principles are com-
patible in the following sections. Here we shall focus on rules of
procedure for making rent adjustment decisions. Procedural fairness
in rent adjustment decisions is the second major administrative
responsibility of a moderate rent control system, the first being
to deliver substantively "fair" rent decisions.
Our model of valid rules of procedure for a rent control
bureaucracy follows closely the examples of Brookline and Boston,
who are themselves modelled upon the state administrative code.
ADMINISTATIVE PROCEDURE MODEL
A. Staffing rules, such as civil service or appointment by a director.
B. Funding sources, such as city government or user fees.
C. Enforcement mechanisms, e.g. penalties.
D. Designation of rent adjustment authority. The locus of authority
can be within the rent control staff or outside of it.
1. Rent adjustment authority within the administrative staff.
An Administrator is designated to hold rent adjustment
authority. The Administrator becomes both judge and jury
in making the determination of a "fair" rent. The Admin-
istrator is also responsible for making policy decisions,
as in Niles where the Administrator had determined the
guidelines for determining a "fair" return.
2. Rent adjustment authority outside of the administrative staff.
Administrative rules dictate the creation of an independent
rent control hearing board (the Board). The Board is the
locus of authority for making policy and rent adjustment
decisions. Evidence, recommendations, and FNOI calucla-
tions are done by the administrative staff and handed over
to the Board for final decisions. The administrative staff
performs the day to day tasks of a rent control office,
such as keeping records, gathering data, and preparing
cases for the Board's review. The Board is only responsible
for making rent adjustment and rent control policy decisions.
E. Definition of the Rent Control Board. (D. 2.)
1. Appointment by an outside authority, such as the mayor or
city council, of board members.
2. Voluntary or paid service consisting of weekly meetings.
3. Complete authority in making rent decisions, as well as in
setting administrative policy, i.e. condominium regulation.
4. A creed of procedural fairness as the guarantor of due
process rights and of substantively equitable decisions.
5. Political representation of the regulatory field. Hence,
appointment of Board members includes equal numbers of
landlord and tenant representatives, and a public interest
member (equal numbers in Boston of all three). The public
interest member, if representative of an odd vote, plays
a role as the "swing" vote to avoid a political allignment
of the Board with either landlord or tenants interests. In
the case of an even numbered Board, the public interest
members' role is still defined as a nonalligned one, to pre-
serve the political independence of Board decision making.
F. Hearings, which can be held at the discretion of an Administrator,
or as a matter of course at the initiation of landlords or
tenants before a Board.
G. Rules of administrative procedure and rules of evidence as out-
lined by a state administrative law code, with exceptions as
noted therein. 24.
H. Designation of which duties are to be handled by the admini-
strative staff with and without hearings.
With these rules a moderate rent control policy establishes both
its organizational structure and the locus of authority for making
its major decisions, what constitutes a "fair" rent. If rules
designate an independent rent Board to hold hearings in the deter-
mination of a "fair" rent, the principle of due process, both
substantive and procedural is established as what constitues a
procedurally "fair" administrative process. The process itself
establishes, to a great extent, the validity of rent decisions.
If the rules designate an Administrator as the locus of authority
for making rent adjustment and policy decisions, a streamlined version
of administrative review is established. In either event, a solidly
bureaucratic administrative system is established to handle the
volumes of paperwork, filings, petitions, and data collection which
wide price regulation of the private housing market entails. The
bureaucracy strives for both efficiency in handling rent adjustment
duties, and procedural fairness in reinforcing the validity of either
Board or Administrator delivered decisions.
PART 2:
The Due Process Model
The theory behind administrative review in a court-like setting
with rules of procedure similar although not identical to those of
judicial review can broadly be called a due process theory of admin-
istrative review. It is a due process theory because its rules em-
phasize the importance of creating a forum for each party to make a
case for or against a petition at hand. Cases are decided by a board
composed of representatives of the political interests touched by a
petition. The board makes final decisions much as a jury does in a
judicial setting. Throughout the regulatory process, due process pro-
tections can exceed or adhere to the legal minimum. These administra-
tive rules designed to protect the regulated from arbitrary state acts
give the process its legitimacy and confer upon it a standard of
procedurally grounded equity.
The underlying theory of a due process model of administrative
review is that the rights of the regulated are best protected if the
system measures itself against the standard of judicial review.
Although this view which puts faith in the ability of a judicial
standard of review to best protect individual rights is argued back
and forth in the literature 25, it remains the prevailing view. Those
disputing its wisdom would argue that professional or material ad-
vantage gives some parties an unchecked edge over their disadvantaged
counterparts.26 Others claim in its defense, that the judicial
standard of review, and use of the courts themselves, is the only
way to define and protect rights newly created and conferred by new-
born public policies, which, this view contends, confer a new form
of property upon beneficiaries.27 And still others claim that non-
judicial, discretionary resolution of conflict is to be preferred,
because it is more efficient and therefore more effective at conflict
resolution than the judicial system.28
Those arguing in favor of a formal due process system point to
the safeguards it offers against arbitrary state actions. Charles
Reich offers a classic defense of full adjudicatory procedures in
his writing, when he comments29
"however cumbersome they may seem (adjudicatory procedures) have
come to represent a fundamental standard of fairness in admini-
strative process. They may be exaggerated and misused until
they produce inordinate delay and expense, but they represent
effective checks on the characteristic evils of proceedings in
any large public or private organization: closed doors, Kafka-
like uncertainty, difficulty in locating responsibility, and
rigid adherence to a particular point of view. They are funda-
mental safeguards for those who must deal with government."
His view can be translated into many forms of regulatory systems.
We shall draw two due process models of administrative review,
used by moderate rent control. One, which we shall name the Due
Process Model Proper exceeds minimum legal due process requirements.
Additional due process protection via appeals, hearings, audits,
and staff inspections of buildings, etc. permit the regulated to
more competently represent their particular interests, according
to this model's theory. Competently representing their interests
is the rationale for the regulated to exercise their due process
rights , both substantive and procedural. These due process guaran-
tees are intended to confer on all parties greater confidence in
the equitableness of their treatment by the administrative system.
The second model is a due process model of administrative review
which embraces the legal minimum. The second model, which we shall
name the Minimum Due Process Model, settles at minimum levels of due
process protections as outlined by the applicable state code of admin-
istrative procedure. Features required by the first model, such as
hearings, audits, staff inspections, and a central role for Board
members in preparing recommendations on each case, are optional in
the Minimum Due Process Model.
The theoretical underpinning of both models, however, is identical.
The underlying theory holds that the regulatory process better pro-
tects individual rights against arbitrary state acts by measuring
itself against the standard of judicial review. There are, however,
differences between the two models. The primary difference between
the two models is the amount of information each requires be brought
to bear on a case as a result of staff and regulated's participation.
The premise of a due process model of either standard is that
information improves the quality of decisions. For a rent control
system, this means information provided by both landlords and tenants
and information culled by the administrative staff. Good information
is thought to yield substantively improved decisions. Good infor-
mation is more likely if three factors are present in the regulatory
system: one, staff practice of exercising more than minimum due
process protection for the regulated; two, timely use of information
so that it stays relevant to the particular case; and three, willing-
ness and ability of the regulated to participate in hearings to
state their case. As Weber has noted of bureaucratic administrative
practice:
"Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise
of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature
which makes it specifically rational." 30
The system has been designed to improve the amount of information
going into administrative review as a principal due process protection.
Furthermore, these due process protections are intended to maintain
the rationality of the process, and to minimize arbitrariness.
We shall present each model and discuss the due process features
of administrative review in each one. We shall then discuss the
relative abilities of each model, because of their particular due
process features, to achieve the equity goals of moderate rent
control. The conclusions of this analysis point to inherent con-
flicts in a due process system of administrative review which
consequently frustrate the ability of system to achieve its policy
goals. The conflicts arise from precisely those features designed
into the system to provide due process protections: one, more
than minimum due process protections in order to gather better
information from all sides; two, generous amounts of time devoted
to each case; and three, ample opportunities for either side to
participate in the process. Yet information gathering, time, and
user expertise can play contrary roles as well as complementary
ones in affording due process protections to the regulated.
In the course of discussion it will become clear that each
model requires the process of administrative review to be a
time consuming one. As due process protections are added to a
minimum protection model, the process becomes more time consuming.
The time factor itself has an effect on the regulated, costing
landlords for whom time is money lost; and as a rule benefiting
tenants, for whom time in the form of a delayed rent increase is
money saved. Time becomes an automatic handicap to landlords.
As due process protections are added to a minimum due process
model, the amount of time required of the staff to process an in-
dividual petition increases,too . Time has an impact on organiza-
tional efficiency in this instance, and usually tends towards slow-
downs and development of a backlog. Additional due process respon-
sibilities for staff can only lead to more work and slower case review.
All parties are free to use the due process features, and tend to use
them strategically. Policy goals can thereby be lost on the regulated.
The strategic use of due process features, or the opposite of this,
inability to marshall these features in self-protection, can also vary
with the addition of protections to a minimum model. Use affects policy.
New Yorker, May 2,1981.
If landlords or tenants have different levels of ability in actually
using the available due process protections, they do not have the
same potential protection under administrative review. Again, a
handicap is placed, usually on small landlords and on individual
tenants. As additional due process protections are added to a min-
imum model, the differential between protections available and those
actually used tends to increase. The balancing goal of moderate
rent control policy can therefore be frustrated by just those due
process features intended to deliver equity. The due process pro-
tections can not be themselves assure use and benefits to the
regulated.
The potential for all three kinds of conflicts is inherent in
a due process model of administrative review. We are comparing a
procedurally full model with a minimum procedure model to highlight
where the conflicts originate. A procedurally full model tends to
display the consequences to both organizational effectiveness and to
the delivery of equity to the regulated earlier than a minimum model.
A model with extra due process protections shows symptoms of backlog,
delay, and "jamming" of the system earlier because these features add
time consuming steps to an already slow process with many participants.
A system of review with additional due process protections is open
to many more variables than a minimum model. As variables increase,
the predictability of results decreases. Rationality of the system
consequently suffers. And the administrative review's ability to
maintain a single standard of equity may decline.
Due Process Models of Moderate Rent Control Administrative Review
The first model relies on features of administrative review
for rent adjustment petitions in the Brookline, Massachusetts
system. Careful, case by case review exceeds minimum legal re-
quirements for due process protections for landlords and tenants.
The second model relies on features of administrative review for
rent adjustment petitions in the Boston, Massachusetts system.
Case review is streamlined, involving only the due process pro-
tections required by Ch. 30A, the Massachusetts code of administra-
tive procedure.
Both rent control systems handle a variety of types of individual
petitions, for example eviction petitions, exemption requests,
hardship appeals, as well as rent adjustment petitions. Because we
are interested in the affects of the rent adjustment process on
equity we shall focus on individual rent adjustment administrative
review practices. How each system of review handles individual
rent adjustment petitions illustrates the due process features
designed into the system and how they affect the interests of land-
lords and tenants. Administrative review of individual rent adjust-
ment petitions represents the "tip of the iceberg "31 by which we
mean that underlying practices for dealing with rent adjustment
petitions lie rules for reviewing all kinds of individual petitions.
What can be said of the ability of due process features to protect
the rights of landlords and tenants in an individual rent adjustment
petition process can equally be said of an other kind of individual
petition.
I. The Due Process Model Proper
A. Individual petitions to the Rent Control Board may be initiated
by either landlord or tenant, who bears the burden of proof of
his claim. The petition process is the method of initiating the
"right to be heard" characteristic of due process.
B. All parties affected by a petition are notified by the Board that
a petition affecting their interests has been filed and that they
may respond and request a hearing. Hearings are routinely held.
C. Petitions can be freely repeated.
D. Information filed on a petition as a rule must be verified. Nothing
is taken on face value. All documents are reviewed for veracity
and applicability to the petition. Incompletenesss of information
short circuits the cycle of administrative review.
E. Hearings, usually requested by staff, play a fact finding role
intended to improve the quality of information entering the
record. Information is tested by participants at hearings,
who present information relevant to their interest in the case.
F. A formal, written record is prepared by staff. The record is
the central document of the petition. The record is reviewed
by at least one Board member, who makes a recommendation to
the Board. That Board member takes responsibility for discussing
his recommendation with the Board at their regular meeting.
G. At a regular meeting Board members, who have read the record,
discuss the case and then vote. The decision is final. Their
record, and the basis for the Board's decision cannot be re-
created in a court of law de novo. The court doctrine of admin-
istrative review limits the court role to verifying that the
Board decision was made according to the record, and consistent
with administrative regulations in force at that time.
Each element of the Due Process Model Proper plays a role in
defining particular theories of administrative behavior. Let us
quickly run through elements A. through G.
Element A. defines the regulatory process as initiated by the
regulated. All classes among the regulated are equally entitled
to use the elements of review. And once either a landlord or a
tenant files a rent adjustment petition, he must prove why the
petition should be approved by the Rent Control Board. Proving
his case represents exercising the due process "right to be heard."
Element B. bears the other major due process feature which is
that all parties affected by a state action must be notified. It
is important for the regulated to be notified that, for example a
landlord is filing for a rent adjustment, so that the tenant can
appear and praise or pillory his landlord to affect the Board de-
cision. A tenant in this position might want to request a hearing
to explain why it is that his landlord does not deserve a rent
adjustment, bringing in such information as that the landlord does
not make prompt repairs, or he does not keep the building safe.
Element B. illustrates the principle that good information
will contribute to a better decision, and that good information is
information acquired from many sources. The staff is relatively
isolated from the conditions of a landlord-tenant relationship,
and from what features of that relationship should be taken into
account by the Board.
In C. we see the simple rule that a landlord or tenant can
petition whenever he or she feels that the agency is not providing
an equitable situation under rent controlled rents. The right
to petition and "to be heard" does not decrease with use.
Element D. regarding staff verification of data submitted with
a petition is a safeguard built into a procedurally full system.
Administrative staff do not accept at face value that landlord
bills, or even contractor affidavits stating that work was performed,
are sufficient substantiation of a rent adjustment request. The
staff takes central responsibility for individually checking each
document, to ensure that the record will be accurate. A staff member
might conduct cost comparison studies to evaluate the appropriateness
of charges. Staff might contact all contractors named on bills.
A final check on the accuracy of this information involves regular
staff inspection of the premises named in the petition. Tenants can
petition to have their units inspected during the staff visit, to
provide more information for the record.
Information must be complete according to administrative rules.
This usually means twelve months of cost substantiation. Completeness
of information is as important as accuracy. Any expense that has
been claimed on the rent adjustment petition must be fully substantiated.
Expenses submitted for the record are expenses incurred in the preceding
year. Hence, a petition filed on January 1, 1981 for that year would
include documentation of costs for twelve months beginning January 1,
1980.
Element E. acknowledges the need for good information upon
which to build a case either for or against the petition. A hearing
permits both landlord and tenants to present their view of the case
to a staff member, and to at least one Board member, who is presiding
over preparation of the case prior to the Board's vote. Primarily,
however, the hearing is a tool for the staff: information which is
inaccessible to staff because they have only one contact with the
building, whereas tenants actually live there can be produced in a
hearing, can be challenged by the landlord, and further questioned
by a staff member. The hearing is a vehicle for transporting higher
quality information into the record than formal rules could possibly
anticipate. Furthermore, the presence of both tenant and landlord
interests acts as a counterbalance to the large amounts of administra-
tive discretion present in a due process system of review.
Element F., creation of a record, underscores the objective nature
of the process. Objectifying the petition by creating a record is
intended to make the regulatory process rational, equally accessible
to all who review the evidence, and accountable for the decision.
The record is public, and only information on the record is used to
make a decision. Reliance on a formal record, and the prevailing
doctrine of administrative review mean that the Board produced record
is the central document of the petition. No other body may create a
record, except the Board. The authority to prepare the record gives
the administrative staff and the Board a two edged duty: the record
must include as much as possible from both sides to be fair, because
it is the principal opportunity for all parties to contribute to how
their petition will be decided; but the Board has discretion over
how much information is too much, how many hearings too many, etc.
Element F. includes another feature, the role assumed by the
Board member in presenting the petition to the Board with his re-
commendation. The decision will not be a pro forma affair, but
rather involves case by case, individually attended to considera-
tion. The independence of the Board from administrative staff
is intended to ensure that the decision will be made independently
of staff responsible from preparing much of the record. Judge is
separated from jury. Board members carry responsibility for setting
the rent control policy of the agency, and in making weekly decisions
in an independent, fully aired manner carry out their responsibility.
The Board meeting also establishes the legitimacy of the regulatory
process in the eyes of the courts. Establishing the legitimacy of the
process according to the larger legal order assists a due process form
of regulatory behavior establish its legitimacy and ultimate authority
among the regulated. Balancing possible charges by those under its
regulation that the Rent Control Board represents a state, coercive
authority, is the due process nature of administrative review which
exceeds legal minimums in an attempt to avoid coercion and inequity.
The opportunity to be heard is the cornerstone of the due process
system.
All of these items taken together establish the administrative
standard for procedural fairness. The due process features which
exceed minimum legal requirements, such as the extensive fact
gathering and verification, staff inspections of buildings, and
multiple hearing opportunities all contribute to the standard.
Such a standard, according the model's underlying theory, should
ensure more equitable decisions. The process is the central
mechanism for putting a check on the "fairness" of the decision.
II. The Minimum Due Process Model
A. Individual petitions may be initiated by either landlord or
tenant, who bears the burden of proof of the claim that the
1971 FNOI was either too high or too low; or that changed
circumstances justify a rent adjustment to produce a FNOI
consistent with the 1971 base year FNOI.
B. All parties affected by a petition are notified by the
agency that a petition affecting their interests has
been filed and that they may respond and request a hearing.
Hearings are not routinely called by the staff, but by
landlord or tenant.
C. Petitions can be freely repeated.
D. Documentation must accompany a rent adjustment petition. Formal
rules describe what constitutes a completely substantiated
petition. Incomplete petitions short circuit the process.
E. Fact finding is at the discretion of the staff handling the case.
Completing the file's substantiation material is the primary task.
Hearings, when requested, play a vital, outside fact gathering
role otherwise not routinely available.
F. A formal, written record is prepared by staff, consisting of
complete cost substantiation data, notes from site inspection
officers, and material, if any, provided at a hearing. The
staff member writes up "Findings" and a "Recommendation"
which is routinely accepted by the Board member officially
assigned to the case.
G. At day time meetings held at the administrative offices, the
Board reviews staff "Recommendations" and usually votes ap-
proval. The decision is final. A new record and another
hearing before the courts is not available, unless the Board
did not vote according to the record before it and in a manner
contrary to agency regulations.
Again, each element in the Minimum Due Process Model plays a
role in defining particular theories of administrative behavior.
We shall only discuss those features in the Minimum Due Process
Model which differ from the Due Process Model Proper. Elements
B. and C. are virtually identical in both models.
Element A. differs from its counterpart in that what must
be proven in a petition, in order to obtain a rent adjustment, is
that a fairly mechanical calculation on the part of the agency is
no longer producing the correct rent level. Fewer discretionary
elements can be brought to bear in this step than in the other,
for what constitutes grounds for a rent adjustment is fairly
specific.
Element D. formally acknowledges the need for complete information
so that the petition can be reviewed in an equitable light. However,
complete information is closely defined by agency rules, and leaves
little room for discretion on the part of staff to dig more deeply.
As long as the landlord provides all items requested by the agency
as evidence of cost substantiation, the process continues. Should a
landlord or tenant request a hearing cost data can be further examined.
Only at this stage can the fairly political nature of the petition
be brought out, and the range of administrative discretion in asking
for additional cost substantiation. In the other model, staff were
looking for the reasonableness of information, as well as for accuracy.
Furthermore, in the other model hearings are routinely called by a
Board member or staff.
The formal written record, of element F. objectifies the process.
However, the contribution of the staff member in writing up "Findings"
and a "Recommendation" put administrative staff much closer to the
role of prosecutor, judge and jury than in an independently decided
process, as in the first model. We could say that the record reflects
fewer dimensions in regard to the interests affected by the case.
And, that the staff member more than the politically representative
Board is making the decision. If this is true, the purpose served by
"making a case" is less obvious or effective than in the first model.
Ironically enough, although this model's rules are streamlined,
and the FNOI device is mechanical, staff exercise more discretion
for their role supersedes that of the Board.
Element G. reflects the secondary role played by the Board in
actually "hearing" the case and in reviewing the facts. The Board
goes through a pro forma exercise. Not as much hangs on the Board
meeting if staff recommendations are routinely accepted. The Board
does not display an independent, policy setting role as it decides
cases and sets precedents. Staff has taken responsibility for that.
Only if a tenant or landlord has requested a hearing somewhere along
the line, and has successfully brought new information into the
record, will the Board have food for thought. The formal rules of
the Minimum Due Process Model suggest that the case has not to as
great an extent been argued, weighed, and sifted by the competing
interests on the petition, nor scrutinized as closely by staff.
Hence, the Board vote is a simpler task than its more active, and
responsible counterpart. The role of the Board in this setting is
sharply curtailed.
In concert with a moderate rent control policy, the goal of
administrative review is to weigh, to balance in its best informed
judgement the relative merits of a petition. A Board has the
potential for being the epitomy of that procedural balancing role
given a broad enough set of responsibilities. Therefore, in
practice and according to policies of administrative review,
the Board in the Minimum Due Process Model falls short.
Conflicts in a Due Process Model of Administrative Review
In practice, each model requires different levels of infor-
mation gathering, different minimum processing times, and implies
different levels of responsibility incumbent on the regulated to
enjoy the range of due process protections in either model's
system of administrative review. The Due Process Model Proper,
Model I , with more due process protections in its rules of
administrative review in regard to information gathering and
evaluation requires that staff take responsibility for making
the record as complete as possible. As a result, Model I is
more time consuming than the Minimum Due Process Model, Model II,
and therefore the minimum case processing time is longer than in
Model II. Furthermore, Model I is more time consuming because
staff and Board review of information is more detailed. Lastly,
Model I places primary responsibility on staff for making sure
that the due process features of administrative review, the most
outstanding feature of which is the hearing, are activated. In
Model II, much responsibility for testing information on the record,
for requiring hearings, and for putting the petition to debate among
the interests affected by the case rest with the regulated and not
the staff.
In each model, therefore, information gathering, time, and
user expertise are variables whose behavior ultimately affects
the nature of rent control policy delivered. These variables,
as we noted earlier, have the capacity to frustrate equity.
Model I allows these variables greater play, and they therefore show
how what began as a greater store of due process protections can dis-
sipate to the disadvantage of both regulator and the regulated.
The Role of Information Gathering in Providing Due Process Protection
Administrative rules may dictate that certain pieces of infor-
mation must be collected from a petitioner to substantiate his
claim that a rent adjustment is deserved. For example, a year's
worth of bills for operating expenses may be required of a landlord.
We would call these rules explicit, and suggest that they severely
limit the range of possible administrative discretion.
Administrative rules may also invoke large amounts of administra-
tive discretion. Such rules may instruct a staff person to judge
the "reasonableness" of a petitioning landlord's expenses. Rules
may also direct that staff member to evaluate the "appropriateness"
of bills submitted, i.e. were the documented costs legitimate ones
insofar as a rent control agency is concerned. Appropriateness
would be judged according to the contribution made by outlays to
the level of housing services previously received by a tenant.
For example, staff might consider whether condominium membership
fees are a legitimate basis for a rent adjustment, or a pass through
to the tenant. Questions about passing along debt service to a
tenant are also likely to arise. The answers rely upon an exercise
of administrative discretion, and are highly subjective judgements.
In the more developed procedural model, discretion is transferred
to the whole Board, who debates the issue. In our narrower model,
staff discretion (perhaps to omit debate) has greater play.
In either instance, with specific rules which omit administrative
discretion on relevance of information, and at least formally strive
for a simplified information file which is either complete or incom-
plete;or,with rules which grant substantial administrative discretion
in actually evaluating the quality of information, due process law
requires that a forum be available upon request to question information.
The forum is a hearing at which landlord or tenant can question the
completeness, accuracy, relevance, or adequacy of information gathered
by administrative staff. Furthermore, landlords and tenants can con-
tribute their own information to the record at hearings.
The obvious purpose of the hearing is to improve the overall
quality of information on the record. Tenants might discover
that work for which their landlord had submitted a bill had not
in fact been performed in all units in the building for which he
was seeking rent increases. On the other hand, a landlord could
explain to staff why it was that he felt obligated to provide more
heat in his building, even though staff research indicated that he
exceeded fuel consumption for a building of his size. His reason
might have to do with the age, health, or preferences of his tenants.
At such forums both interest groups can dispute the accuracy
of information from their point of view. Due process opportunities
encourage that debate to occur. The premise of a due process
system of administrative review is that accuracy of information im-
proves the equitableness of the final decision. It is the element
of balance between interests in determining accuracy, or adequacy, etc.
that satisfies the mandate of moderate rent control, and of the desire
for good information. Good information improves the quality of the
record, as well.
Furthermore, hearings do provide procedural checks on administrative
discretion, whether stimulated by formal rules or not. A decision to
answer any of the questions asked on an earlier page about the appropri-
ateness of cost pass throughs could go undetected if it were not for
a mandatory hearing to discuss cost data. The Due Process Model Proper
does include this hearing opportunity as a rule. The Minimum Due
Process Model would rely upon a tenant interested party to request a
hearing.
In sum, a due process model must address the question of
quantity and quality of information. A model with more routine
due process features, such as regular hearings and Board meetings
for debate is most likely to answer both questions. High quality
information is that which reflects the interests of all parties
affected by the petition. As the goal of Moderate Rent Control
is to balance what are viewed as conflicting interests, the
presence of hearings and debate initiated by the agency strides
closer to the goal than a model which places the burden on unfamiliar
petitioners.
The Due Process Model Proper, as it affords on a regular basis
more opportunities for landlords and tenants to place information
on the record, affords greater due process protection in its system
of administrative review. That is how the model works in theory.
The Role of Time in Providing Due Process Protection
But information gathering is time consuming. Beyond a certain
point the process may be counterproductive. Although providing more
information is thought to enhance due process protections, time can
erode these advantages intended to benefit landlords and tenants.
Minimizing the amount of time required to collect information for
a rent adjustment petition is important in preserving the quality
of the information upon which the Board's decision is based. Old
information is often flawed.
The flaws develop sometimes simply because operating costs,
such as fuel charges, have increased during case preparation due
to supply and demand factors. Or, flaws can develop due to inflation.
In periods of rapid inflation, such flaws develop quickly. Three
months time may render inaccurate cost information on a case record.
Inflation has plagued moderate rent control's effectiveness since
1975 . Flaws can also develop during lengthy information gathering
steps because situations change: a tenant moves, the building
changes hands, the landlord changes suppliers and gets a better
deal.
Information gathering rules and required hearings may make the
case record more complete, but if the record does not go before
the Board in a reasonable period, the flawed information provides
little due process benefit. Insofar as a rent adjustment petition
represents a highly individual petition for which information is
uniquely gathered, reviewed, and assigned any changes in detail
for whatever reason flaw the accuracy of the record. Tailoring an
individual response to a petition with a record which no longer
accurately represents either the landlord or tenant petition does
not produce effective rent control policy. Extra opportunities for
adding information to the record have, in this instance, not provided
greater due process benefits.
A due process system of administrative review always makes filing
a petition a lenthgy process. Minimum filing times are determined
under what we would describe as the "best of circumstances" which
implies no case backlog, an efficient staff, and no impending barriers
to timely administrative review, such as staff reductions. Yet
as any of these negative factors enter the picture, processing time
increases. Processing time is also likely to increase under a
due process system of administrative review as the regulated take
maximum advantage of their right to request hearings, continuances,
and appeals. In short, strategies can be created around the time factor.
Because a procedurally full system of administrative review is
an inherently time consuming one, delay from whatever source threatens
the ability of the regulatory system to deliver decisions based upon
accurate information. A delay has to add only a two month increment
to the processing time, and a tolerable three month wait in a
streamlined model for a landlord or tenant can become an intolerable
six month endurance contest. For the Due Process Model Proper, a
normal six month span can become eight months. Such time delay
questions the ability of the regulatory process in matching admin-
istrative behavior with stated policy goals.
Numerous sources of administrative delay are internal. One
frequently active source is staff turnover. Only an expert and well
organized staff can handle a large caseload efficiently so that
timely decisions are reached. The variable of staff expertise
keeps an otherwise lengthy process within tolerable time limits for
the client. But a staff populated with inexperiences staff due to
frequent turnover cannot maintain efficient processing levels.
New administrative staff take longer to process rent adjustment
petitions for a variety of reasons. First, new staff must familiarize
themselves with agency regulations. Second, they must develop a
rapport with regular clients and an understanding of their quirks.
Third, new staff must develop individual strategies for handling
routine delays, such as cancelled appointments and other official
duties, which continually intrude on processing responsibilities
of individual petitions.
The implication of slowed processing time is that a backlog can
develop. If backlog develops new petitions must wait in line behind
the backlog before processing can even begin. A backlog adds time
to an already lengthy processing term. When a rent control agency
using either model of administrative review develops backlog, the
agency then places itself in the position of always needing to
"catch up" with its work load. Policy goals of moderate rent
control are challenged by organizational needs to "catch up" and
gain control of workload. The agency's ability to achieve its policy
goals and deliver equitable decisions is decreased proportionate to
energy diverted to overcoming backlog. Backlog induces dysfunction.
Backlog penalizes both landlords and tenants. Backlog causes
delay which impairs the quality of information going into the
record. And as we noted, the time consuming nature of the process
always threatens to induce flaws in the information on the record.
The existence of backlog guarantees that this will be so.
Consider this simple example. A landlord who has filed a
petition for a 10% rent increase who due to backlog is forced to
wait from January 1, 1980 to January 1, 1981, a period of 12%
inflation, has actually suffered an economic loss under rent
control. The delay has cost him 12% increased operating costs
for twelve months with no concomitant rent adjustment. Delay
of twelve months in part due to backlog has also caused a 12%
decline in the dollar value of his petitioned rent adjustment.
A tenant is not penalized in a monetary way, indeed some
might claim that delay due to backlog is money saved for the
tenant. But an example to illustrate the damage in due process
protection afforded a tenant if backlog and dysfunction occur
can easily be drawn, based on the accuracy of information dis-
covered at a hearing. A landlord may claim that borrowing costs
for capital improvements require a $65 per month rent adjustment;
eight months pass. The tenant questions the merit of the improvements.
The Board approves the increase. And the following month interest
rates fall. Should an appeal from the tenant take eight months more,
the appeal route would not be attractive because of the possibility
of future changes again. The time factor frustrates such an appeal.
Although a landlord penalized by the normal leng th of the review
process or by internal sources of delay such as staff turnover still
believes that he has an equal chance to make his case and be heard,
a landlord confronted with a three or four month backlog begins to
realize that the deck is stacked against him. A tenant also aware
of the existence of a sizeable backlog, would think twice about
activating due process avenues of review. It is in this regard that
the existence of due process protections alone does not insure
that the benefit will accrue to anyone. Organizational dysfunction
can produce a climate in which equity is not possible for any of
the regulated. Organizational dysfunction begins to generate a
reputation for the organization such that the regulated will not
deal with it, regardless of due process protections on paper.
Equity as a consequence suffers.
In conclusion, a due process model of rent control review must
grapple with the negative impacts of time on the agency's ability
to provide due process to landlords and tenants. Its ability to
deliver equitable decisions, to maintain its legitimacy, and to
survive are all a function of its capacity to minimize case
review time. Although the Due Process Model Proper has the
capacity to develop a highly detailed record reflective of the
interests of all parties touched by a rent adjustment petition,
if that information is not collected and acted upon in a timely
manner its value is lost. A Minimum Due Process Model is less
time consuming but nonetheless must grapple with time as a variable
in its ability to provide due process to the regulated. Time
is always a predictable handicap to landlords in both models.
The lengthy nature of either model's system of review is
compounded by other factors. Organizational inefficiency will
quickly add processing time to a case. If this occurs on a
regular enough basis, backlog can develop. Backlog penalizes
landlords, for whom time is money; and it penalizes tenants,
whose record loses relevance. Backlog damages the regulated's
perception of the agency's neutrality, as well. If backlog
frustrates the willingness of the regulated to "use" the system,
due process rights have effectively been lost. Ironically enough,
the additional sources of time in the process are due process
features designed to give rather than destroy due process protection.
Yet the due process system of administrative review has inherent
sources of conflict many of which flow from time having different
impacts among the regulated.
The Role of Expertise in Providing Due Process Protection
Knowledge of how to initiate a petition and to take advantage
of the due process features of either model of rent control is a
key variable in either model's achieving its goals. Willingness
to use the system based on a faith in its neutrality is also
necessary if the system is to provide due process. Both due process
models cannot function unless both expertise and willingness are
present.
Tenants must learn how and when to enter the petition process.
A tenant exercise of judgement on cost substantiation data can mean
that rents will not in the opinion of the Board deserve an increase.
The Board may decide not to grant the whole requested increase. As
tenants learn from staff how to participate and make themselves heard
on the record, taking such a step becomes easier. Routine use of
petitions, hearings, and testimony by tenants can make the process
progress more quickly, too. Skill increases with use.
Alternately, increased skill among tenants in applying due
process rules can lead to strategic use of these rules. Tenants
may decide to deliberately slow down the review process in order
to maintain their rents at current levels for as long as possible.
As such strategic use of the system occurs, staff discretion is
further tested, as a protracted process compromises the neutrality
of the agency.
As tenants rarely have the means to hire professional help,
such as an accountant or a lawyer, personal experience is their
major source of expertise. The likelihood that a tenant will
have information entered to the record, or that he will successfully
question landlord cost substantiation data can only increase with
experience at going through the petition process. Organizational
theorists have developed elaborate observations about the
'players' in a regulatory 'game' and how they build skills. 3 2
The frequent conclusion of such discussions is that professional
and repeat 'players' have a built in advantage over others.
In the example of rent control this would suggest that tenants have
a heavier handicap than landlords in respect to skill, and the role
of skill in making available due process protection.
Efforts to "jam" a due process model of administrative review
increase with the availability of time consuming review steps.
The Due Process Model Proper requires initial hearings, and en-
courages the use of hearings whenever a reasonable doubt exists
about the reliability of information. Tenants may on principle
request hearings at every available opportunity, may make appeals,
cancel appointments, and cause delays at hearings so that they
must run over to another date. Such tactics, a compensation per-
haps for lack of professional expertise, push the burden of
proof back onto the landlord and the staff that any rent increase
is deserved. It is a simple fact that the longer a landlord's
rent adjustment petition remains in the procedural pipeline, the
longer the maximum legal rent rests unchanged. The Minimum Due
Process Model requires more effort on the part of tenants to
manipulate into this protracted, knotty position.
Landlords have expertise on their side, and more frequently the
means to hire professional help on their rent adjustment petitions.
However, we should not assume that the ability to hire professional
help contributes to equity, for paying for help in obtaining a rent
adjustment merely decreases the value and hence the "fairness" to
the landlord of the adjustment. A due process model is designed so
that petitioners do not have to "pay " to use the system. Due
process rights are supposed to confer benefits, not exact costs.
Yet the clock is always ticking, and all delays are costly, what-
ever their source. Expertise must be used as a defense against
the time factor. Small landlords pay the highest price.
As these handicaps arise and affect the odds of one interest
group manipulating due process features for strategic advantage,
administrative discretion must be exercised to prevent the agency
from becoming the tool of one interest group and thereby losing
its legitimacy. Such handicaps are present with both due process
models inherently, and vary by degree. The Due Process Model
Proper places more responsibility with staff in offering additional
due process features to the regulated, and especially to tenants.
The Minimum Due Process Model assumes that either landlords or
tenants will take the initiative to request hearings, and makes
few overtures, even though as 'repeat players' landlords are likely
to have greater expertise than tenants. Both models are susceptible
to manipulation, however, by landlords and tenants to degrees which
vary with the level of initiative required of inexperienced users.
With a fall in its perceived neutrality due to protracted petition
processing time and procedural fisticuffs, a rent control system
loses its legitimacy. Landlords and tenants become unwilling to
exercise formal due process protections, believing it to be futile.
In this event, a model which exceeds the legal minimum delivers
no greater benefit than a streamlined model does.
CONCLUSION
The central principles of due process administrative review
are: a procedurally full system allows all parties to make a
case on their own behalf; balanced information leads to more
equitable decisions; and decisions based on an objective, rational
process guarantee procedural equity, the foundation of substantive
equity. These principles imply an individually tailored case
review. They imply a time consuming process. And they imply handi-
caps due to individual differences in ability to use an adversary
process. In theory, a due process model is designed to include
features which will protect the individual against arbitrary state
behavior.
But information, time, and expertise of the regulated all play
roles in determining whether or not a due process system of admini-
strative review delivers adequate protection against arbitrary
state actions. These factors can combine to work against equitable
treatment by a rent control agency of landlords or tenants.
These features are variables any due process model must address.
For Moderate Rent Control, the competitive nature of landlord
and tenant interests makes maintenance of a due process model of
either description a difficult task. Time and expertise handicap
landlords and tenants differently despite agency goals of balancing
these adversarial interests. The tendency of both models discussed
and to a greater extent of the Due Process Model Proper, is towards
a time weary, overburdened process easily manipulated by skilled
users. Dysfunction is a predictable consequence of the kinds of
backlog likely to develop due to such manipulation. Dysfunction
due to backlog is also likely due merely to the time consuming
nature of a due process system of administrative review.
For both Moderate Rent Control and a due process model of
administrative review the balancing role sought by both is an
inherently unstable one. An agency defines its rent control goals
in regulations, which define equity by setting in balance economic
interests of landlords and tenants according to formulas or to
general guidelines. Due process procedural mechanisms calibrate
that balance. But inherent conflicts in a due process system,
primary among them the handicaps distributed on all parties by
time and regulatory expertise, inevitably tip that balance.
A model with more numerous due process featues cannot make the
balance more stable. In fact, what we have discovered is that to
the contrary, these additional features may make the balance
less stable. The goals of Moderate Rent Control and the pro-
tections associated with a due process system of administrative
review are elusive ones.
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NOTES
32. The following is Galanter's diagram to explain why the "Haves"
tend to come out ahead in a due process system.
WHY THE "HAVES" TEND TO COME .UT AHEAD
Element Advantages Enjoyed by
PARTIES - ability to str-ucture
transaction
- specialized expertise,
economies of scale
- long-term strategy 
- re
- ability to play for rules professional*)
- hargaining cre dbility
- ability to in
penetration
LEGAL - skill, specialization, - organized
SERVICES continuity pro essional*
wealtihy
ITSTITU- - passivity - wealthy.
TIONAL - cost and delay barriers experienced,.
FACILITIES organized
- holders.
posessors
- beneneciaries
of existing rules
- favorable priorities - organized,
attentive
RULES - favor 'le rules - older,
culturally
do mina nt
- due process barriers - holders,
possessors
in the simple sense of "doing it for a living"
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MODERATE RENT CONTROL IN BROOKLINE and
THE DUE PROCESS MODEL
Brookline, Massachusetts' rent control law relies
upon a Moderate Rent Control Policy Model and the Due Process Model
Proper system of administrative review. A synopsis of policy and
administrative changes in Brookline from 1970 to the present will
be presented to illustrate reliance on each of these models.
Furthermore, we shall explore how the Brookline rent control sys-
tem has responded to tendencies in the system to tip the balance
between landlord and tenant economic interests such that the
neutrality of the regulatory agency is in question. Some of these
tendencies were hinted at in earlier sections, such as the possible
conflict between thoroughness and administrative efficiency; that
between administrative efficiency and equitable treatment of the
regulated; and that between case by case review of individual
petitions and organizational survival. Threats to organizational
survival threaten delivery of a Moderate Rent Control policy.
The features of Brookline's rent control policy we are most
interested in are those which reflect the nature of administrative
review according to our Due Process Model Proper. Our history
will be selective in favor of such features. In Brookline, all
rent control policy is made by the Rent Control Board (the Board)
with advice from the Director-Counsel. The Board holds special
meetings to publicly discuss policy issues, as well.
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Policy Considerations in the Start-up Years 1970 to 1974
Although Brookline was legally empowered to enact rent control
in 1970, with the passage of state enabling legislation c. 842 and
Brookline's own c.843, a law suit against the not as yet formed
rent control agency enjoined the agency from enforcing any of its
rules until the end of 1971. Despite the fact that the rent
control system was not activated during 1970, landlords anxious
about the effect of rent controls on their buildings immediately
submitted rent adjustment petitions to the newly appointed
Director. The Director had barely begun to assemble his staff,
and draft administrative regulations, when petitions began flowing
into his office. During the time that this suit against the rent
control agency was pending and therefore prevented it from acting,
a tremendous backlog of unattended cases and paperwork developed.
Brookline's rent control laws were cleared by the courts by
February, 1971 when the agency could begin processing rent adjust-
ment petitions. However, a by now assembled staff was confronted
with year old rent adjustment petitions. What further complicated
the picture of administratively inexperienced staff employing
untested regulations upon a wary clientele was the sheer magnitude
of their problem. In addition, the rent rollback date of six
months prior to the September, 1970 imposition of rent controls
set legal maximum rents at several levels. For those landlords
who had entered into one to two year leases with tenants as was
customary at that time, the rollback date caught them as the leases
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expired during the six month rollback period. For these landlords,
legal maximum rents were set at 1969 or 1968 levels. For others,
the rollback date was March, 1970, although imposition of rent
control was upheld for four months. Hence, confusion abounded
among landlords over the rollback policy and over how initial,
"base year" rents were going to be set. As the base year figure
might differ among units owned by a single landlord, or between
landlords as the rollback date affected them differently, so too
would subsequent rent adjustments on this base vary. The system
was roundly castigated for mismanagement and inequity.
The newly formed Board was faced from the outset with the
challenge of adopting policies which would set equitable rent
levels across all units. The number of eligible units for re-
gistration and adjustment as of the end of 1971 was 10,432 1, a
sizeable caseload for an agency which in 1970 had three full
time staff and which by 1971 had grown to nine, six of whom were
completely new to the job.
The Board voted in July, 1971 to adopt a policy which would
bring all units in line in regard to rent adjustment levels. The
Board decided to adopt a policy of granting general, automatic
rent adjustments for the year which did not require individual rent
adjustment petitions and Board votes. The general adjustment, or
GA as it is known, was a major time saving administrative tool.
The GA was implemented to correct the imbalance in equity created
by administrative inefficiencies during 1970 and early 1971.
In principle, a GA represents average costs for units in
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specified classes, such as twenty unit structures or units in gas
or oil heated structures. Market study data is used in determining
the average which will satisfy cost requirements of efficient op-
erators, perhaps giving them a small bonus; and penalize inefficient
operators, in all likelihood small property owners, not taking into
account their special circumstances or their reasons for exceeding
average operating costs. A case by case review, on the other hand,
can detect such differences.
In 1971 the GA was calculated based upon data collected by the
Institute of Real Estate Management. This information was submitted
to the real estate trade organization by members on a voluntary
basis, hence it was not a representative sample. Yet the Board
relied upon staff recommendations for a GA based upon this data.
For the period 1971 through 1974 the annual GA averaged 8%. In
later years, price indices such as the CPI were also consulted.
The 1971 GA designated three classes of units. Class I
included all units eligible to receive an adjustment to bring
rent levels up to 25% above January 1, 1968 levels; and those
receiving the 15% maximum GA voted by the Board. Class II in-
cluded units not eligible for an adjustment, because they had
received adequate individual adjustments since 1970. Class III
included units not properly registered with the agency. In all,
6,190 units received the GA representing 59% of all potentially
eligible units.2 (See Table 8)
Each year thereafter, the Board voted an automatic GA in order
to make available a timely rent adjustment for landlords, and an
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administratively efficient tool for setting an approximately
"fair" rent. During the period 1971-1974 approximately 50% of
registered units took advantage of the GA provision suggesting
that it set rents at levels which allowed an economically ade-
quate rate of return for landlords. (See Table 9) Increases
averaged 8% per year for the four year time period, although
the GA was actually doing duty for the years from 1968 to 1971,
due to the effect of the rollback date. Hence, individual rent
adjustment petitions were also filed by landlords seeking more
than the annual GA.
These rent adjustment petitions were one of several kinds of
individual petitions also handled by the administrative staff
from 1972 to 1974. In addition to rent adjustment petitions,
there were individual landlord petitions for capital improvement
related rent adjustments, tenant rent adjustment petitions, exemptions,
eviction for nonpayment petitions, and eviction for reasons other
than nonpayment. In all, the caseload for those years was 720
cases in 1972; 929 cases in 1973; and 914 cases in 1974. Staff
size during these same years grew with caseload from three full
time administrative staff, with part time staff as needed to the
eleven year peak of eleven full time administrative staff, and
three part time. In 1972 the agency acquired a new Director-
Counsel as well. (See Table 4)
Satisfaction with rent adjustment decisions was low. Landlords
expressed their dissatisfaction in the form of law suits against
the Board. Litigation involving rent adjustment reached its peak
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in 1973 at 106 suits over individual rent adjustment decisions. This
litigation was timeconsuming for the Director-Counsel, who in addition
to regular administrative duties was forced to prepare for trial in
all of these cases. For the four year period the Director-Counsel
had to go into court over 700 times! Only with the decision of
Sherman in 1975 which held that if the Board decided upon the
record before it which had been created by the administrative staff
the court would not provide a new hearing and a new record. The
court said that it would only provide review of the Board's record,
to verify that the decision had been based upon the record and
according to c.843. Thereafter, litigation over individual rent
adjustments declined to what are now single digit numbers. (See
Table 10)
From 1972 on the Board voted time saving procedures in the
area of rent adjustments in addition to an annual GA. The Board
acknowledged that lengthy individual rent adjustment petition
processing time continued to corrode the value of rent adjustments.
The Board could see that the moderate rent control policy agenda
of the administrative system was not being adequately met. But
rather than tamper with their administrative model as a whole,
which exceeded minimum legal due process protection for both
landlords and tenants, the Board created small, parallel routes
of administrative review. These routes were designed to afford
opportunities to landlords to keep pace with operating expenses
without having to go through a lengthy process of administrative
review. These shorter routes were implemented with the intent
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of contributing to administrative efficiency.
The principal example of an early 1970's efficiency device passed
by the Board is what was called the Short Form Capital Improvements
petition. The Short Form was designed to allow quick approval of
rent adjustment requests due to capital improvement related expenses.
The Board granted a rent adjustment as long as the landlord properly
documented his capital improvement costs. The advantage of filing
for a Short Form Capital Improvement adjustment was that the Board
voted a higher rate of return on the unamortized cost of improvements
after the initial year than it would have allowed under a GA, or in
all likelihood under a regular rent adjustment petition. The first
year of the Short Form, the rate of return was 10%. The 10% rate
considerably exceeded the annual GA for the period 1971-1974, it
was quick, and it therefore offered major financial incentives to
landlords to file.
The Short Form Capital Improvements petition was initially de-
signed as an incentive to landlords to maintain their property, as
well as an efficient administrative tool for the agency. The Short
Form avoided a lengthy individual petition process and administrative
review to minimize case overload. Quick processing time avoided
penalizing landlords economically due to time delay, as the
individual rent adjustment petition was doing. And as we noted,
time delays represented money lost to landlords, who were absorbing
costs until the date of approval by the Board of their petition.
Even the GA forced landlords to absorb costs for the year.
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In fact, the Board continued the policy of a Short Form until 1979.
During the use of the Capital Improvement Short Form, the rate of
return was raised to keep pace with capital costs. The rate rose
from 10% to 12% two years later, and by 1976 to a 15% annual rate
of return on the unamortized cost of capital improvements exceeding
$ 2,500.
Policy Considerations in the Middle Years, 1975 to 1978
During the middle years of rent control administration, the
Director-Counsel began to be concerned that the data upon which
the GA was being calculated was not closely enough related to
the actual costs of Brookline landlords. He also sought a more
representative sample of cost data. Nonetheless, in the interest
of organization efficiency, the Director-Counsel sought to maintain
use of a GA. Hence, staff cost data collection responsibilities
were redirected to gathering actual Brookline cost information.
This information would therefore reflect the exact nature of
Brookline's housing stock, which consists of larger, brick buildings,
medium sized brick buildings, and four to six unit wooden structures.
Also, the heating systems of these structures varied by age and
by type, some using the more costly oil, and others using gas heat.
In order to increase the precision of the GA, new classes of
units were designed, to take into account size differences in
structures, the type of heat provided, the extent of landlord
provided services, and the levels of municipal charges.
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The Director was attempting with these refinements in how the GA
was to be applied to different kinds of units to move it in the
direction of the individual rent adjustment petition, insofar as
the individual petition was decided on the basis of individual
circumstances. Once again, however, the consideration over how
many GA classifications to create was bounded by the interest of
organization efficiency. After all, the whole purpose of relying
upon the GA from the administration's point of view was for achieving
greater processing speed. Should the agency adopt too many GA
classifications, computing the GA would cease to be a simple, or
timely process.
In 1975 the annual GA rate was 11.4%. It included fuel ad-
justment provisions and pass through of real estate taxes to
tenants. In 1975 the general adjustment was retroactive in effect
and included 1974, the annual average rate therefore for 1974 and
1975 being 5.7%. For 1976 the GA was 5.7% and again included a
fuel adjustment and pass through of taxes to tenants. In 1977
the GA was 5.0%, and in 1978 4.1%. Both years included an ad-
justment for fuel cost increases, and a tax pass through. The
Board's decision to allow pass through of these costs is one
of the major features of moderate rent control. However, the GA
as an average figure allowed an estimated average pass through,
and therefore may have benefited efficient operators and penalized
inefficient ones. (See Table 3)
Perhaps the GA policy contributed to a small decline in staff
caseload from 1974 to 1975. The number of total cases handled
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by staff fell from 914 to 829, although staff size remained at eleven.
In 1976, caseload seemed to reflect a plateau, settling at 846 on
a staff of the same size full time, but with two part time staff lost.
In 1977 caseload again declined from 1974 levels, this time to786.
But in 1978 it began another climb to 860 and the staff remained
the same size as in 1976. For the years 1972 to 1978 the caseload
had grown 29.1%, or approximately at a 5% annual rate. Yet the
actual annual rates were erratic, and caused administrative
problems. There was no way of preparing in advance for what was
already an increasing case backlog, for staff could not be increased.
(See Table 4) An increased budget appropriation was needed for that.
In 1977-78 cases were distributed by type such that the most
numerous categories were evictions for nonpayment, evictions except
for nonpayment, and landlord capital improvement petitions. In
the eviction category, 254 cases were for nonpayment and 182 for
other reasons. In the Landlord capital improvement category cases
numbered 101, and for regular landlord rent adjustment petitions
50, for a total landlord petition category total of 151. Tenant
rent adjustment petitions totalled 153. Tenants were very active
that year in questioning the legitimacy of rent levels. It is to
the credit of the administrative process that it encouraged more
tenant petitions in that year than landlord petitions. Tenants
must clearly have perceived the system of review open enough
such that the effort of filing an individual petition would be
both possible and fruitful.
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During these years the Board functioned against a backdrop of
general political support among Town Meeting members and their con-
stituencies for rent control. When state enabling legislation was
due to expire in 1975, the Town Meeting voted almost unanimously to
adopt Article XXXVIII of the Town Bylaws to become effective
December, 1975. Article XXXVIII was Brookline's rent control bylaw.
The Town Meeting made a second significant decision in 1978
when at a Special Town Meeting a moratorium on issuance by the
Rent Control Board of certificates of eviction for condominium
conversion was voted. The moratorium became effective September,
1978 and was to last for twelve months. The concern of the
Special Town Meeting is illustrated by the 1978 caseload figures
we just reviewed, which showed totals of 430 eviction cases.
We may assume that at least 180 of these were for condominium
conversion purposes, and possibly more than the 180 obvious cases.
The Board and the agency were therefore set upon a powderkeg.
The Town Meeting had taken a radical position on condominium con-
version, one not dared elsewhere in Massachusetts. The moratorium
put the Board in the position of regulating property use, and not
merely rent rates. The moratorium continued into 1979.
Landlords at this juncture in the history of Brookline's rent
control were faced in 1978 with several choices under rent control.
They could accept the GA, which was less than half of the inflation
rate and the cost of borrowing capital. They could opt for an
individual rent adjustment petition, although the tradeoff was
between trying for a rate higher than the GA but risking a long delay
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and ultimately receiving less than the automatic GA. They could
undertake capital improvements and file for a rent adjustment with
the Short Form, by 1978 being eligible for a 15% rate of return.
As we have said, the GA represented an average cost adjustment
attuned more to the housing market than to individual situations.
We remarked that it might as an average confer a bonus on efficient
operators. Certainly the GA guaranteed a timely adjustment, and to
landlords time represents money saved or lost. A look at how one
major professional management corporation behaved and how one long
time, individual major real estate owner in Brookline behaved sheds
some light on the most economically attractive routes.
The professional real estate management corporation is Niles
Company, Inc. which manages the 720 unit Westbrook Village, two
thirds of which sits in Brookline, and one third in Boston and
all of which as of 1970 came under rent control. The units in
Brookline and Boston are identical one, two and three bedroom
apartments. We can assume that Niles can afford to hire pro-
fessionals to assist in any of its individual rent adjustment
petitions, thereby arguing for their ability to prepare a con-
vincing petition. On the other hand, as they are a large cor-
poration, we would assume that Westbrook Village enjoyed certain
economies of scale, such as in heating, maintenance and repair
costs making the GA an attractive option with major benefits.
In fact, Niles chose to accept the GA in 1975, 1976 and 1978.
It had also accepted the GA in 1971, 1972 and 1973. Petitions for
individual rent adjustment were filed in 1976, when Niles received
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both a GA and an individual adjustment. The Board as a rule does
not allow two adjustments in one year, or both a GA and an indi-
vidual adjustment: however, it did make this exception. Niles
also filed a successful petition in 1977, rather than taking the
GA.
Niles' behavior bears out the suspicion that the GA does in
fact offer major economic advantages to efficient landlords. In
Niles' case we may very well suspect that the average cost ad-
justment represented by the GA did compensate them at levels both
adequate to meet operating costs and to provide a desirable rate
of return. That Niles opted for the GA also suggests, because
the nominal GA rate was so low relative to inflation, that the
GA saved enough on filing time to make the effective rate higher.
Niles accepted the 1978 GA of 4.1% at a time of double digit
inflation!
In 1976, when Niles received the GA and filed an individual
petition, rents on lower priced units increased 13.5%, from $222
to $ 252, other units reflecting the same rate of increase. Yet
in 1977, another petition year, rents only increased on those
same units to $ 265, a rate of 5%, identical to the 1977 GA rate.
After 1977, Niles continued to take the GA. Perhaps we can infer
two things from their experience with the two available forms of
rent adjustment. First, that gaining an economic advantage with
an individual petition was difficult, even for so expert a user
of the system who had extensive professional expertise at its
disposal. And second, time delays further jeopardized the pos-
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sibility of gaining from an individual petition, whereas the GA was
a predictable, timely alternative. From 1970 to 1981, Niles has
only filed three individual petitions and taken the rest as GA's.
Over a ten year period, this means roughly that they earned a 9%
per year average increase in rents from the Brookline Rent Control
Board. See Tables 15, 16 , 17 for ten year rent data for Niles.
Our second example is that of Mr. George Buehler, for several
years a landlord interest representative on the Board. He began
his Board membership in 1972. Mr. Buehler owns, according to his
estimates, over 100,000 square feet of residential rental property
in Brookline which he fully intends to maintain as rentals: that
is his principal business to which he is committed over the long
term.
Because he was an early Board member, and joined in the same
year as the agency's second Director-Counsel, he participated in
drawing up new rules, and became familiar with all Board policies.
He learned then, he said, that "It's difficult to separate politics
from rent control." From Board meetings, he could observe how
political interests viewed petitions and that there would rarely be
an easy consensus on a rent control decision. From both sides of
the table, he would describe the hearing process as a difficult one,
for landlords were required to make public all of their records:
although a diligent user of the individual petition, he said that
"the hearing experience is a horrible one."
Mr Buehler had spent six years prior to 1972 learning the ropes
of FHA, another regulatory structure which required petitions for
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rent adjustments, and submission to a regulatory agency on rent
setting decisions which in the private market are landlord
decisions. He credits his six year experience with FHA for pro-
viding the regulatory experience needed to successfully navigate
Brookline's rent control process. He also said that the experiences
with FHA conditioned his expectations of what would be possible
when dealing with a regulatory agency.
Each year Mr. Buehler, "gritted his teeth and always went for
the individual adjustment" as he describes his efforts. He also
took great advantage of the Short Form Capital Improvements process.
He viewed the Short Form as a tremendous incentive to file. Because
he was so accustomed to the steps one had to go through from his FRA
experiences and presumably from his time on the, Board as well, he
geared up for providing all of the necessary cost material.- Mr.
Buehler commented that for him filing an individual petition was
fairly straightforward. He was critical of the low capitalization
rates relied upon by the middle years Boards to determine a
"fair return" and compared himself wryly now to " a mortgage in
a thrift institution, holding a 5% note."
Mr. Buehler noted that for financial reasons the individual
petition was to his advantage, rather than the GA, and that the
Short Form helped him remain in an economically sound position
during the middle years. However, he expressed dismay over the
Board's application of its FNOI concept, which he implied was
so vague as to leave the question of determining a "fair rent"
open to political forces and to unpredictability. He said that
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from his point of view as a former Board member and as a landlord,
the flexibility made good administrative sense, but that in his
view what existed in Brookline was not the difference between the
Napoleonic Code and flexibility, but between flexibility and
virtually no consistent guidelines at all.
From his experiences we could conclude, therefore, that he
relied upon his own extensive regulatory experience to overcome
both the potential time loss and the unpredictability of the
individual rent adjustment process. Unlike Niles, who seemed to
value the time saved in a GA on an adjustment and on going
through the hearing process, the individual petition for Mr. Buehler
represented the straightest route to higher rents. His experiences
may suggest that personal relations with the Board were also a major
condition on which his decision hinged. This familiarity reduced
the risk by some degree. One can also assume that over ten years
Mr. Buehler also gained in experience on how to most expiditiously
use the regulatory system to his advantage. He would not charact-
terize his present position as an economically easy one, but credits
his own aggressive use of individual petitions with putting him in
the best possible position under rent control.
From 1975 to 1978 still over half of all landlords took the
GA. Processing time of individual petitions approached a minimum
of six months. Among all of Brookline's major landlords we have
seen how two chose to navigate the system. The two experiences
suggest that only the most experienced regulatory user could get
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satisfactory results from the individual petition process. We emphasize
the value of experience, both with the individuals on the Board and
with the nature of regulatory agencies themselves, rather than the
ability to hire professional help.
Policy Considerations 1979 to the Present
The Board continued its policy of voting an annual GA by
approving a 1979 GA of 3.6% for oil heated buildings only.
The following year, 1980, the Board approved a GA of 6.5% for
oil heated buildings, and of 4.4% for gas heated buildings and
included a tax pass through provision. For 1981 the Board adopted
a GA of 7.2% for oil heated buildings and 3.5% for gas, with no
tax provision. These GA's are all less than the double digit in-
flation rates which have persisted since 1979. For gas heated
buildings, the rates are also historically low for the Board.
As of 1981 the Director-Counsel believes that the GA has
been further refined to match actual housing costs for particular
kinds of units. He believes that it has come a great distance
from 1972 when it was calculated on industry provided data to
the present when staff conduct extensive research. The GA has
been continually refined to address particular kinds of units,
distinguished by the kinds of heat, size of the building, and
the extent of landlord provided services, as well as by the date
of a unit's most recent individual rent adjustment, except for
capital improvement related adjustments. Up to five classes of
119
units have been designated for general adjustments, and three
classes for fuel general adjustments. Designation of further
classes is limited by a desire to retain the quick, efficient
nature of a GA. The ten year trend of the GA concept has been
to provide refined market data on which to calculate adjustments.
This goal contrasts with that of the individual petition, which
is decided on a case by case basis. Yet the GA as it is refined,
becomes a more precise tool even though units receive adjustments
en masse.
The Board took on several new policy responsibilities beginning
in 1979. Two of these followed on the 1978 vote of a Special
Town Meeting to declare a moratorium on condominium conversion.
The Town Meeting designated the Rent Control Board to handle
individual petition processes related to condominium conversion,
which began in 1979. The Board required a petition for a certificate
of eviction by developers of condominiums from formerly rental
units under rent control. Developers and owners of condominiums
were also required to file for removal permits, to obtain permission
to remove the unit from the rental housing stock. Eviction pro-
tection was given to tenants living in cooperatives not under
rent control under a new town bylaw and hearing responsibility
fell to the Rent Control Board. These new duties were assigned
to the Board by Town Meeting: the Board had no choice. The assign-
ment was seen as a natural one by Town Meeting members because the
Board had an entire regulatory framework in place. Yet the duties
were not conventional rent control duties which refer to rental units.
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Most importantly, 1979 was a turning point for the rent
control system because even though duties and caseload continued
to reach new highs, the Town Meeting voted to reduce administra-
tive staff for fiscal year 1979. A staff cutback at a time of
growing administrative responsibility augured backlog and
administrative overload.
This overload did not dissuade the Board, however, from
voting in 1979 to stop the Short Form Capital Improvement
petition. The Board had become increasingly sensitive by
1979 to claims from tenants that the Short Form was causing
"economic eviction" due to Board approved rent increases for
capital improvements. Some tenant interests claimed that the
Short Form was being used by landlords merely to make money.
Others claimed that landlords were upgrading their properties
at the expense of tenants, and contrary to the spirit of rent
control. Yet others charged that the capital improvements
being done were nonessential to the tenant's housing services,
and were merely a ruse for obtaining an unwarranted rent in-
crease.
In 1979 the Board abandoned the Short Form in favor of
a Long Form. The Long Form resembled the regular individual
rent adjustment petition process. On the Long Form, the
landlord was required to go through more steps of administra-
tive review, and at the end he was not guaranteed as high a
rate of return, as on the Short Form. Tenants acquired more
opportunities to challenge the Long Form capital improvement
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rent adjustment petition. The Long Form admitted more political
forces into the decision, as well. The Board took this step de-
spite the loss in administrative efficiency. The Board was re-
sponding to political pressures and its perception of the mandate
of moderate rent control.
In 1980, however, the Board did vote for an administratively
streamlined procedure to encourage landlord investment in energy
saving capital improvements. The Board adopted a Short Form Energy
Improvement petition, on the example of the Short Form Capital
Improvement petition. The Short Form for converting from oil to
gas, or for insulating, or for installing storm windows was seen
as an incentive to landlords to weatherize their buildings. These
improvements would keep the cost of providing heat down, and would
therefore keep landlord operating costs or tenant fuel bills down.
Hence, the Board reasoned, rent levels could be contained more
effectively. The connection between the Energy Improvement Short
Form and an economic benefit to tenants was clearly drawn. The
Energy Improvement Short Form offered a 15% rate of return.
The response of landlords, such as Mr. Buehler, has been to
take advantage of the Short Form. Although for some of them
the cost of borrowing capital for these improvements exceeds
15%, they nonetheless find economic advantages to doing the
improvements and filing. It is not clear whether these im-
provements are only being taken for their contribution to
cash flow under rent control. Such"improvements enhance the
fair market value of-the buildings under anticipated' decontrol.
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The overall response of landlords since 1979 has been to con-
tinue to file in increasing numbers for individual rent adjustments,
eviction permits, removal permits, regular evictions, and conversion
permits, among others. In 1979 a full time staff of ten took on
the entire caseload which included many time consuming steps. Data
has to be gathered, an audit on cost substantiation material conducted,
hearings held, memoranda prepared, and a full record of the case
studied and voted upon by the Board.
In 1980 the staff acquired one clerk and typist to help process
the multitudes of correspondance and documentation associated with
individual petitions. But effective July 1, 1981 staff will be
reduced by three. For fiscal year 1982, due to cutbacks stimulated
by Proposition 2 , full time staff will be cut back to eight. The
size of the voluntary Board will continue at seven, consisting of
two tenant interest representatives, two landlord interest repre-
sentatives, and three "public interest" representatives.
A look at the size of the caseload will suggest how serious
the burden has become, and how much more serious a problem it
will create for a smaller administrative staff, with only two
safety valves, the GA and the energy related Short Form.
In 1979 caseload exceeded 1978 levels and reached an all time
high of 1,083. In 1980 for the calendar year, caseload totalled
916. For January 1981, the most recent caseload data available,
the number of petitions filed was 137 for one month. This one
month figure for 1981 is higher than one month figures for 1980
and earlier. If January figures are annualized for an albeit
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generous estimate, 1981 caseload might look like 1,348. (See Tables
5 and 6)
The trend has continued to be one of increase. The most numerous
application categories are landlord filed. These categories are:
landlord petitions for rent adjustment and for capital improvement;
landlord petitions for eviction for nonpayment and for reasons other
than nonpayment; and in 1981, for the month of January, landlord
petitions for removal permits and conversion permits.
Landlord annual rent adjustment petitions almost tripled from
1977 to 1980, growing from 50 to 148. Landlord capital improvement
petitions dropped off markedly from 1977-78 when the Short Form was
available and produced a caseload of 101 to 1979 Long Form levels
of 54, and 1980 Long Form levels of 28. The rapid decline, which
may include large numbers still in the pipeline from the end of
1978, suggests how much of a disincentive to file the longer form
modelled on a system of full administrative review is. A lengthy,
and uncertain process threatens negative economic impacts.
Landlord initiated eviction petitions have exceeded 200 for
each year in the category of nonpayment. For three years, the
petitions in the other than nonpayment category averaged 200.
Removal permit applications in 1980 were 89, although January
1981 showed 35 filed. Condominium conversion permits, new for
1981 were 20 for one month, suggesting that for the year they may
easily exceed 100.
Because of the increases in kinds of petitions handled by
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staff and by the Board, the amount of time required to process what
are in absolute terms more petitions has increased greatly. All of
the administrative steps required by a typical individual petition
are necessary steps, there are no short cuts at present. Further-
more, handling individual petitions comes on top of other staff
responsibilities, such as collecting data for the GA computations,
attending Town Meetings, and attending many nightly Board meetings.
Table 15 outlines the typical steps in an individual rent
adjustment petition. It may take ten days between filing time
and the time a landlord has provided all of his cost substantiation
data. Another week may be required to complete a staff audit of
all of the cost material submitted by the landlord. The following
week a staff member will conduct a personal inspection of the
building, and any units in which tenants have requested inspection.
A "Prehearing Memorandum" is prepared after the inspection. An
"Audit Report" is prepared. And an "Inspection Report" is prepared.
An "Analysis of Returns" compares a NOI using several criteria
for determining NOI used by the Board. In the following two weeks
a hearing is held, presided over by the same staff member and at
least one Board member. It is informal and is taped. The tape
is later transcribed into memorandum form and attached to the
"Prehearing Memorandum." After the hearing a "Post Hearing
Memorandum" is created, composed of the "Prehearing Memorandum"
and testimony. It also contains recommendations to the Board by its
member. A date is set for hearing the case at the next available
slot in a Board Meeting program. The entire process takes at least
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three months with no backlog. As of 1981, the process takes
at least six months, and oftentimes longer.
The time factor alone may explain the willingness of most
Brookline landlords to accept the GA, rather than risk an un-
familiar and detailed petition process in which all of their
records become public information, and during which the value
of their petitioned rent adjustment declines. Especially
among small property owners, a six month delay in receiving
an adjustment, after the year's costs have been absorbed, can
spell disaster for profit margins are often small. It may well
be that only well organized, experienced, large scale property
owners can afford, literally to wait six months for a decision.
A cautious inference from tenant rent adjustment petition
data shows a dramatic drop in the number of tenant initiated
rent adjustment petitions that could perhaps be explained by
relative tenant satsifaction with their "moderated" rents.
Most rents in Brookline reflect the GA rate. In 1977-78 over
150 tenant initiated petitions were filed. In 1979 only 95
were filed. In 1980 a mere 68 were filed. Yet as we have
just documented, growing landlord dissatisfaction with levels
of return available under the GA and rent control itself have
produced increases in the numbers of individual landlord petitions
filed. Data for 1981 shows particularly high filing levels.
Our discussion so far has concerned itself with the affects
of increases in filing responsibilities on the administrative
staff. We have witnessed enormous case buildup, a developing
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backlog, and increased pressure on the individual, case by case
review of petitions system of review. The efficiency of the
staff in preparing these cases for Board consideration has de-
creased. The measure of this decrease is the minimum six month
processing time which a landlord must tolerate before being able
to charge an increased legal maximum rent. Our example of a most
efficient operator, Niles Management Company, Inc. indicates that
the GA is the preferred route, especially as individual rent ad-
justment processing time has increased. An initial conclusion
to be drawn here is that the slowdown caused by an administrative
system of case by case review, instituted in the spirit of equity,
has become too slow to accomplish its stated goal. The system has
instead shifted the major burden of achieving equity between
landlord and tenant to an administrative device called the GA,
which conceptually is not designed for case by case review.
The case buildup also has consequences for the Board's
ability to handle caseload. Although administrative staff
prepare the case, it is the Board which must read the case
record and vote on individual petitions. As the absolute
caseload increases for the Board as well, we might suspect
that the issue of equity between landlord and tenant also arises.
If under an overloaded administrative system the burden has
been born predominantly, perhaps until quite recently, by a
case by case review mechanism, is something of equivalent
effect occurring at the level of the Board?
127
The Brookline Rent Control Board and the Due Process Model
The seven member Rent Control Board has continued to hear
an extraordinary number of cases annually, despite the fact
that the Board is entirely voluntary and uses many weekday
evenings of its members. The ratio of petitions filed to
those heard is approximately two to one, for the past four
years, (See Table 7). Yet even if a petition does not make
it to a Board meeting for a vote, at least one Board member
has taken initial responsibility for that case. The Board
has for the past several years heard over 500 cases annually.
The Board plays a key role in not only filtering but also
contributing to the quality of information going into an
individual petition decision. The Board, and individually
members assigned to a case, bring to bear their experiences
from having handled other similar cases. Their large prior
experience enables members to ask better questions about the
accuracy of information, or about the adequacy of information
filed by a particular landlord. Furthermore, they know many
of the landlords both by reputation and through at least ten
years of dealings with the rent control agency. This experience
contributes to expertise.
The expertise is particularly valuable to tenants, who may
receive additional protection against rent increases by virtue
of it. Tenants are frequently unfamiliar with the hearing process,
and welcome advocates where they hesitate to assert themselves.
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A Board member may reiterate what the rules have already required
to have been done, for example, notification of the tenant of the
proposed rent adjustment amount. But the tenant may not have fully
understood the meaning of the notice. At a hearing, an experienced
Board member would know to verify that the tenant has in fact under-
stood the meaning of the notices sent to his or her apartment.
A Board member may also explain in person to the tenant his rights
to challenge the proposed increase, and the administrative means
for so doing. These gestures often produce better information.
The quality of information used by a Board to make individual
decisions, as well as the quality of information it uses to set
rent control policy determines the Board's ability to make equit-
able decisions. We discussed the role of information in a due
process system in Chapter Two and underscored that it was a central
one.
The quality of information is primarily reflected in the case
record itself. Even as individual cases multiply, the amount of
information required by the agency's rules has not diminished.
If anything, the due process opportunities afforded by the system
mean that the amounts of information going into a case can grow
almost without limit, until the Director-Counsel at his discretion
imposes one.
Since Sherman, in 1975 and later confirmed by Niles and
Zussman in 1977 the role of the record has been enhanced as
the basis upon which Board decisions achieve legitimacy. With
Sherman the courts said that the decision of the Board would stand
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as long as the Board's decision was based upon its record and made
according to its official regulations. A new trial and a new record
before the courts would not be provided to landlords (or tenants),
the court said. The court would only verify that the Board decision
had been made on the record.
Each case before the Board must therefore be carefully read,
and the basis for reaching a decision carefully designed according
to administrative regualtions in force. Otherwise, the Board de-
cisions are open to legal challenge. As the legitimacy of the rent
control laws in Brookline, and the agency itself, are on the line
every time a rent adjustment case goes to litigation, so the Board
must work diligently to make sound decisions.
As a rule the Board has continued to make sound, legitimate de-
cisions. Litigation over rent adjustment decisions and over other
forms of individual petitions have declined each year since 1977.
The reduction in litigation is a testimony to both changes in the
legal doctrine of administrative review and to the soundness of
the "knowledge" upon which the Board has been making its decisions.
The Board can in this sense be praised for the "fairness" of
its administrative and policy process. The Board has adhered
closely to Brookline's rent control law's standard of equity.
The standard, as we have explained, is both substantive and pro-
cedural and exceeds minimum due process legal requirements.
Nonetheless, shortcomings in the system which may be inherent
features of the system, are apparent. The Board may struggle more
with these features as caseload increases. Most of these features
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have to do with what we shall call gaps in information, or imper-
fections in information on the record. The three major kinds of
imperfections we shall discuss are: the gap between "perfect
knowledge" and available knowledge; the gap or shortfall in the
process between the amount of due process protection available
and that exercised, especially by tenants; and lastly, the gap
between the stated standard of equity as embodied by the FNOI
concept and that actually delivered due to time delay.
These three characteristic "gaps" in the Brookline rent
control system which is so heavily modelled on a due process
notion of administrative review ultimately impair the ability
of the Board to maintain its role as a balancing arm between
landlord and tenant interests. We are suggesting that these
so called "gaps" are inherent in a due process type system of
administrative review. Although these three characteristic
tendencies of the system are now only symptoms of distress in
an agency otherwise still able to cope with its regulatory tasks,
they are increasing in intensity. As the gaps widen, the ability
of the Board to deliver a "fair" rent will decline. So too will
the Board's ability to set equitable rents. The size of caseload
coupled with staff cutbacks is the principal factor aggravating
these symptoms of distress.
Shortcomings of the Due Process Model Proper
The first shortcoming we observe in a procedurally full system is
the gap between "perfect knowledge" upon which the Board bases an
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equitable individual petition decision, and available knowledge.
Of course, the claim of this thesis is that the Due Process Model
Proper produces better information than its streamlined counterpart.
But not surprisingly gaps exist. They exist inherently.
Many of the gaps occur because of the requirement that the Board
make its decisions based on an objective record. Incomplete infor-
mation can result if knowledge does not make it into the formal
record. An example of this might be testimony made by a tenant to
a member of the Board outside of a hearing, when a record is not kept.
Or another example might be testimony given in a hearing, but later
outside of the hearing contradicted by that same individual who does
not understand that this confidence with a Board member will not
alter the basis upon which the Board must decide. The problem
typically arises because tenants are afraid to antagonize their
landlords in a hearing for fear of reprisal. The landlord power
to evict is credited by some as having a powerful impact upon tenant
willingness to be too critical.5
The second characteristic shortcoming of the system derives from
the willingness of landlords or tenants to actually use the due pro-
cess features available in the system. The due process system of
review can only work if activated by a party to an individual petition.
The gap between due process protection available and that exercised
may have several probable sources.
Let us create an example to illustrate the possibilities.
Suppose a new landlord of a three unit structure alerts the Board
of his plans to convert the basement of the building into a living
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room for his own comfort. The building has formerly been absentee
owned and therefore under rent control. The new owner has
stated his intention of moving into the building, which would qualify
it for exemption from rent control. The new owner seeks exemption
approval from the Board. According to standard administrative pro-
cedure, notification of a petition seeking exemption is sent to the
building's two existing tenants in the other two units. These
tenants, as with many enjoying protection from rent control, are
concerned that a long term benefit that they value may be at risk.
Suppose further in this case that one of the tenants has heard
from neighbors that this landlord lives elsewhere, and that he has
a history of converting properties into condominiums, which is his
actual business. The tenant in our hypothetical case is elderly,
and the new landlord a gentleman in his forties
In order for the elderly tenant to convey information about
the new owner to administrative staff, and thence into the case
record, the tenant must usually request a hearing. The request
must be a formal one, in writing. The request for a hearing
will be automatically granted, but the hearing date must be set
according to the order in which the landlord exemption petition
is being handled. As the administrative rule s.4 states, "Peti-
tions and applications shall be numbered, docketed and processed
in the order that they are received."6 Given a six month case
backlog as of 1981, the hearing date will be at least six months
in the future. On occasion, at its discretion, the Board will
designate a hearing and a hearing date ahead of other petitions.
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At the hearing several months later, the tenant must state his
or her claim. If the claim is that the landlord has no intention
of moving into the building - which may have already occurred because
of the time lapse between the petition's filing date and the hearing
date - the tenant must have the conviction that making this claim
will not damage the landlord-tenant relationship. The tenant knows
that if successful, the landlord will not be restrained by rent
control in setting the rent, and that he will raise the rent. The
tenant may suspect that the increase will be even greater because
of his comments made in the hearing about the landlord's intentions.
The tenant may decide to proceed anyways. However, the claim
must be substantiated. The tenant must have concrete proof that
the landlord does not intend to make the unit his permanent home.
It is particularly difficult to prove that the unit is not the
landlord's principal residence if the landlord is currently living
in the building. The burden of proof upon an inexperienced tenant
is a heavy one.
Should the tenant overcome the risk of making a claim, he or
she must nonetheless assume a further burden of substantiation.
The tenant may prefer to state his or her belief to a Board member,
without proof. Or, to state this belief outside of the hearing,
in the expectation that this statement is adequate evidence against
the exemption petition to insure its denial.
It of course is not adequate. The record will so far not contain
any information to suggest to the Board that it should deny the
exemption request. The Board must therefore grant the exemption.
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Its only choice, should members have doubts about the case, is to
call a new hearing on the case. Yet the issue of substantiation,
a burden born by the inexperienced tenant, remains.
The lesson to be drawn from the example is that even if tenant
safeguards exist in the formal administrative system of review, they
are only as effective as they are used. Otherwise, the Board is
helpless to step in to "construct" a record. Many factors outside
of the Due Process Model affect the likelihood of tenants to use
the due process mechanisms to produce an improved record. Should a
tenant overcome ignorance or fear of the system, the tenant must
nonetheless gather proof of his claim. An elderly retired, and per-
haps nonprofessional tenant has a difficult and unfamiliar task.
For either landlords or tenants not accustomed to the formalities
of a system which works with documented evidence, a formal record,
and formal rules applied by a Board, the process of participating
is an unwieldy one. Most individuals are accustomed in their daily
routine to informal relationships with authority, whereby a request
is made person to person, at the moment desired, and a decision
follows. That process is not objectified by a record, nor is it formal.
The Board's process is a formal one and cannot include informal
behavior instead of its formal rules, especially in regard to the
record.
The third characteristic feature of the system is the
tendency as petition processing time increases for a gap
to develop between the stated standard of equity, and that
actually delivered. Delayed processing impairs the value of
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information on the record, puts landlords at an economic disadvantage,
and dilutes the financial value of the decision reached by the Board
after so many months.
In Brookline, the typical rent adjustment petition process as
we described in detail earlier and in Table 15 takes at least
six months. Processing time aIfter audits have been conducted,
hearings held, memoranda prepared, and a Board meeting date ar-
ranged is often longer than six months. One factor which continues
to contribute to lengthening the processing time is the size of
caseload. A second major factor is the growing case backlog. A
third major factor is reduced staff capacity in the form of post-
Proposition 24 cuts, of earlier staff reductions, and of lowered
staff expertise due to a relatively high turnover rate among hearing
officers. An overarching factor which contributes to staff burden
is Town Meeting's assignment of new policy and administrative duties
to the staff and the Board. These factors combine and compound the
problem of lengthening processing time.
In addition, a feature of the Board's GA and individual adjustment
policy compounds the problem for landlords of time lag. Rent adjustments
become effective for prospective rents only, not retroactively. When
a landlord rent adjustment petition is filed on January 1, 1981 it
will become effective only upon its approval. If approval comes in
six to nine months, then at least 75% of the rent increase will only
take effect in 1982. Yet the rent adjustment petition has been filed
because 1980 income is not adequate for 1980 costs, and the petition
asks the Board to grant an increase to meet 1980 costs. Hence, by 1982
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the value of the rent adjustment has declined, as 1982 costs are
predictably higher than 1980 costs. The information going into
the decision has become antiquated, although it was initially out-
dated for prospective operating costs and necessary rent levels.
Let us take an example. Suppose in 1981, Niles Management
Corporation files an individual rent adjustment petition with the
Board. The petition is filed and docketed on January 2, 1981.
At the Director's discretion, this case is placed ahead of others
on the docket. A hearing date is set for March 2, 1981. At the
hearing, Niles' cost substantiation data for 1980 are examined.
Fuel costs we shall assume to have been $ 500,000 for 1980. At
the hearing, a tenant representative for Niles tenants points out
that electricity for air conditioners has been made into an extra
charge for some tenants. Niles is claiming utility charges of
$ 300,000 for 1980, and a necessary increase of 30% to cover
such items as air conditioners. It claimed a need for a 35%
increase in its fuel allowance. Both increases, Niles claims,
are due to increased fuel costs to them, and are not due to in-
creases in services provided.
The Board decides to continue the hearing to another date,
which is set for March 16. On March 16 the Director-Counsel
gives Niles (See Table 17) his opinion on the issue of air
conditioners. A transcript of the hearing is prepared following
the March 16 hearing, and remaining administrative steps are
completed. The Board schedules the Niles petition for May 26.
On May 26, the Board votes to allow Niles a 10% increase in
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maximum legal rents. From petition filing date to a decision the
process has taken six months, three months less than if the case
had not been moved ahead on the calendar by Director discretion.
During the first six months of 1981 assume a 15% inflation rate.
Niles can now increase rents 10% for the second half of 1981,
and for 1982. If we make some rough estimates about the cost of
delay and the impact of inflation on Niles' ability to earn a
FNOI, it will be clear that the Board's stated standard of equity
and the negative financial effect of a slow processing system are
working out a new effective standard, to Niles' disadvantage.
The value of a 10% rent adjustment for twelve months of 1981
with 15% inflation is a 5% loss in terms of 1981 operating costs,
at least. In fact, the 10% adjustment has been based on 1980 costs,
and is geared for a FNOI on a 1980 balance sheet. Niles must wait
until 1982 to obtain an adjustment based on 1981 actual expenses.
But the increase is not effective for twelve months. Because of
the six month processing period, Niles can only raise rents as of
June 1. Therefore, we can hypothesize that the loss due to infla-
tion is closer to 10%, at least. The loss due to the six month
delay is in addition to the 10%.
As fuel charges have risen, the amount of a typical rent dollar
attributable to these charges has reached approximately 45%,
according to research done by the rent control agency administrative
staff.8 A six month processing lag increases the likelihood of
this percentage climbing above 50%. In addition, due to the
Director-Counsel's opinion to Niles on providing for electricity
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used by tenant air conditioners as a required landlord service,
Niles' electricity charges could not be covered by an increase
in the maximum legal rent if more tenants chose to install air
conditioners. Fuel charges have pushed electricity charges up
at a rate almost equal to their own, leaving Niles exposed to
a potentially growing expense and little economic succor. (Table 14)
The Board's decision six months later to grant Niles a 10%
rent adjustment falls below staff research's conclusion that at
least a 10.97% increase is necessary to keep up with rising fuel
costs.9 It falls short of keeping pace with inflation by 5% as
of the filing date, and 10% as of the increase date. Niles has
had to absorb these losses and can only hope to recoup them at
their next individual petition. Yet backlog and delay will only
have increased by 1982, making their chances of "catching up"
highly unlikely. In fact, it is the decreasing ability to "catch
up" due to time delay and continued inflation that makes the
gap between a FNOI as determined in, for example 1974, and a FNOI
determined in 1981 a growing one.
From Niles' point of view, the Board's behavior in 1981 shows
a less equitable attitude towards Niles' needs than in the past.
It is not the case that the Board is balancing tenant interests a-
gainst those of the landlord, and striking a balance based on
stated policy goals. Instead, the inability of the Board to
grant a timely increase has put the landlord at a significant
economic disadvantage relative to housing market behavior. The
Board does not show a future capacity to correct this tilt in
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the regulatory balance.
CONCLUSION
Over the past ten years, individual petitions have grown in
variety and in the extent of their use creating an enormous
caseload for the Brookline Rent Control Department's administra-
tive staff and for the Board. As caseload grew through 1979,
staff began to suffer cuts. Further cutbacks occurred in 1.980,
1981 and 1982. A backlog of six months has been developing
during these years, which guarantees a minimum petition processing
time of six to nine months. We describe the agency as overloaded.
Two safety valves were used during the case buildup to relieve
the staff of some forms of individual petitions. The GA had been put
in place immediately in 1971 as an administrative tool for improving
efficiency and procedural equity, and has been used continuously
in that capacity, undergoing refinements to improve its accuracy
for particular kinds of cases. A Short Form which did not require
a lengthy petition allowed landlords to realize rent increases if
they made capital improvements in excess of $ 2,500. One version
of the Short Form was eliminated in 1979 over ambivalence toward
the effect of these increases on tenants; and another version for
energy saving capital improvements took its place. Nonetheless,
individual petitions continue to mount in number. Time lag and
inflation have cut the benefits provided by many of the Board's
individual petition routes, as well as by the GA,
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Due process features in Brookline's system make the administrative
task a time consuming one. Time spent on delivering full due process
protections to landlords and tenants especially has eaten into
organizational efficiency. Time spent by landlords awaiting Board
rent adjustment decisions has eaten into the dollar value of their
petitions and into the credibility of the rent control organization
itself. A balancing of landlord and tenant economic interests by a
due process model has inevitably broken down.
The due process system of administrative review tends to slow
down naturally. Hearings, information verification, extensive
documentation of petitions, and careful Board review of the formal
record are inherently time consuming procedures. There is no way
around any of these steps if full due process protections are to be
delivered. The Board's efforts in the past to combat the tendency
of its system to slow down was to design alternative routes in the
system, such as the GA; or to add staff; or to enhance administra-
tive capacity with recourse to computer services. But staff cut-
backs, new policy duties for the Board and staff, and budget
trimming occurred. Caseload increased. These efforts to reduce
caseload are no longer adequate.
The major remedy that the Board had hoped for to reduce
caseload duties was a shift from reliance on individual, case by
case review to general annual adjustments. But fewer landlords
are satsified by the GA as of 1981, judging from the data which
indicates increases in individually filed landlord petitions
for rent adjustments, capital improvement adjustments, and conversion.
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Furthermore, the intended efficiency in the GA due to use of a computer
service will not be available to the Board for 1981 and 1982 due to
staff shifts in the Town-wide computer service center. The shift in
case burden the Board had hoped for is not occurring. The due
process administrative model continues to drive the gears of an
individualized, case by case review process. This is an inefficient
situation. Unless individual processing of all documentation,
individual inspections, regular hearings, extensive staff document
preparation for the record , et al. are trimmed the system can
only be expected to slow further, as caseload continues to grow.
Board actions to improve efficiency are necessary if Brookline's
original moderate rent control policy is to be maintained. With the
current delays in petition processing it is now impossible for the
Board to deliver a FNOI to landlords who must wait a minimum of six
months for a Board decision. The delay costs them both adequate
revenues and losses due to uncompensated for past outlays. This
was not the intent of moderate rent control policy. Its goals
require passing along costs to the tenant as they occur; adjusting
FNOI as needed due to inflationary pressures; and weighing
landlord and tenant economic interests in a neutral, administrative
setting, not in one which inherently handicaps the landlord due to
organizational inefficiency.
Analysis of Brookline's rent control organization, a "best case,"
suggests that the due process model itself may require attention.
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POSSIBILITIES AND CONCLUSIONS
"To be inefficient is to be ineffective."
Roger Lipson, Director-Counsel
Brookline Rent Control Department
Thus commented the director of Brookline's rent control organization
in reference to the effect of overload, backlog, and what portends to
be increased regulatory duties for his organization, itself the recent
victim of Proposition 2 forced staff reductions. Yet he is committed
to the policy goals of moderate rent control, in particular that his
agency preserve its legitimacy as a neutral ground in which to resolve
landlord and tenant conflicts over what represents a "fair" rent.
Inflation, spiralling interest rates, and high heating costs pose
difficult choices for the Board in its deliberations over what re-
presents legitimate cost pass throughs to tenants in setting an
individually petitioned "fair" rent. These economic pressures
nonetheless compound the organization's most pressing problem, which
is dysfunction due to overload, backlog of cases, and resulting in-
efficiencies.
Among those factors contributing to workload, the detailed,
case by case review dictated by the Due Process Model Proper is
the only factor completely within organizational control. Working
on the model of administrative review to reduce time consuming
processing steps is the response most likely to succeed in im-
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proving organizational efficiency. Streamlining the model is a
major "possibility" although its effect will not be limited merely
to improving organizational efficiency. Our conclusion is that
such a change will also produce revisions in the levels at which
the Board sets a "fair" rent, i.e. in regard to equity among the
regulated.
Streamlining the Due Process Model Proper
To streamline the Due Process Model Proper requires a movement
away from the standard of judicial review for administrative proceedings.
It also requires that the level of detailed staff review of individual
petitions change. Due process protections designed into the Brookline
system above the legal minimum requirements are the first targets,
and the choice of which features to eliminate rests with how to best
save on staff time.
In the standard process of administrative review of rent adjustment
petitions there are three steps which can be taken to relieve staff
overload by cutting down on staff time devoted to individual petitions.
The steps are eliminating individual audits of cost material,
elimination of property inspections, and readjusting the FNOI level.
Step one, replacing individual audits of all landlord cost
substantiation material with spot checks, or with rough comparison
of landlord figures to agency determined maximums would save staff
time at the beginning of a case. This step risks missing inaccurate
or inflated cost data submitted by landlords, which if it is not
caught by a relatively expert agency hearing examiner is unlikely
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to be detected later in the case review process by a tenant. Step
one also eliminates the rationale for tenant presence at cost audits,
as staff review is not an individualized, case by case, item by item
check.
The second step to save staff time is eliminating individual
apartment inspections. Existing policy requires staff inspection
of units for which rent adjustments have been requested, and special
inspections of units upon tenant request. The intent of the inspec-
tion requirement was twofold. First, personal inspection would reveal
if the landlord was in fact delivering the level of housing he was
claiming expenses for. Second, personal inspection would uncover code
violations, or inadequate landlord provided services, or simply in-
accuracies on the record. In reviewing a rent adjustment petition
the Board would therefore have information with which to gauge a
tenant claim that the requested rent increase is undeserved. The
staff inspections were also an instance of staff responsibility for
improving the quality of information on the record and for fortifying
tenant rights under available due process opportunities.
The third, and perhaps most economically significant policy step
is adjustment of the FNOI mechanism for setting a "fair" rent as a
time saving move. Adjustments might be made by reference to an index,
such as the Consumer Price Index or an administratively compiled
cost of living index. Such a reference would automatically incor-
porate the inflation rate into rent adjustments. Operating efficiencies
available to some landlords, such as well insulated buildings, or
economies of scale would confer a bonus, although not to tenants.
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Automatic pass throughs triggered by Board set standards would
protect currently exposed landlord economic interests, but offer lit-
tle recourse to tenants. For example, capital costs might be used as
a standard. If the prime moved to 20%, the Board might adopt a
standard to allow a FNOI for landlords of 15%, or 18%, or even 20%.
Step three would involve incorporating market research regularly
into the FNOI calculation in a formulaic manner, rather than relying
on the case history of FNOI for each case. The predictability of
decisions would increase, as well as the uniformity of rents among
landlords. Time could be saved immeasurably in this step which
significantly cuts down on the role of hearings and Board meetings.
Tenarnt testimony would have less role in influencing Board
determinations of a "fair" rent in this context, for mechanical
cost pass through formulas would do most of the work. Adjustments
would be made not based so much on landlord and tenant individual
situations, but based on broad market behavior. Due process rights
and protections for achieving greater equity in their housing would
be lost to tenants. The balance set by the Board would tip in
favor of the landlord.
Another form of streamlining the due process model of administra-
tive review of individual rent adjustment petitions is adopting a
short form rent petition, much as the Board has done for capital
improvement related rent adjustments and for energy related capital
improvement related rent adjustments. This fourth streamlining
step increased staff efficiency in the two instances in which it
was applied. A short form rent petition could offer time saving
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steps for staff and landlords. A short form might eliminate the
rule for twelve preceding months' cost data, and instead require
prospective cost estimates for the coming year, which the Board
would then review. The Board decision, even if delayed by several
months, would still reflect current costs and would set a FNOI
which kept up more closely with actual landlord expenses. This
step represents a radical change away from placing the burden of
proof squarely on landlords that they have borne such and such a
cost and therefore deserve compensation in the form of higher
controlled rents; and away from extensive staff preparation of
the record, along with tenant and Board participation.
Adjusting the General Annual Adjustment Rate
Supplementary potential for siphoning off caseload due to individual
petitions, and thus saving staff time, resides with the GA. The GA
rate must be set high enough to satisfy most landlords to accomplish
this goal. The average GA of 5% for the past five years has not
been adequate to achieve this. The number of individual petitions
filed by landlords to increase rents has increased. To reverse that
trend and case overload as well the Board might consider setting the
GA higher.
An upward adjustment in the annual GA to more closely approximate
costs of borrowing capital, or of maintaining a building moves the
GA mechanism away from individualized classes of adjustment,and back
towards a general, market oriented adjustment. Efficient landlords
could benefit over and above the general economic benefit afforded
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them by a higher GA than historically granted. The GA is an efficient,
timely, predictable adjustment, preferable to landlords of whom it
requires no regulatory initiative, and no risk of delay. The tenant role
in affecting whether his landlord receives a GA is nonexistent.
The attractiveness of the GA to the rent control organization is
twofold. On the one hand, the GA can be used defensively to draw away
individual petitions from overburdened staff. As important, the GA
can on the other hand allow the organization to continue using its
Due Process Model Proper, because individual petitions should decrease
in number dramatically. With fewer individual petitions, and fewer
incentives to go that route among landlords, the staff should be able
to handle with the same degree of due process care what individual
petitions are filed. Raising the GA and perhaps thereby
offering efficient landlords some bonus, and maintaining the same
exacting standards of administrative review to protect tenant interests,
offers the best compromise now available to the threatened agency.
Redefining the Regulatory Field
On April 30, 1981 the Brookline Town Meeting voted to amend town
bylaws to allow a condominium owner who has resided in his unit for
at least two years to be exempt from rent control. The rationale was
that condominium owner occupants closely resemble single family house
owner occupants, who are exempt from rent control. In the heated
debate rent control advocate Representative Bussinger argued that
condominiums were not like single family houses, for they had recently
belonged to Brookline's rental housing stock. As the purpose of rent
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control was to preserve rental housing opportunities for people of low
and moderate income, he viewed exemption of condominiums from rent
control as a direct contradiction of Brookline's rent control mandate.
He further argued that the rent control agency would find itself hard
put to determine that a landlord who claimed he had been living in his
condominium for two years and would now like to rent it was telling
the truth. Businger predicted widespread abuse of the bylaw, in the
form of individuals buying condominiums, living in them a short while,
and then filing for exemption from rent control and renting the units
out at market rates.
Director-Counsel Lipson of the Brookline agency disputed this claim.
Responding to Businger's query, "Who is going to blow the whistle?"
Mr. Lipson replied that, "When the slightest doubt is raised, the Board
holds a hearing." He noted that this has always been Board policy, and
shall continue. Tenant due process rights have not been curtailed. He
did not foresee trouble with the new bylaw.
But the new exemption illustrates how definition of the regulatory
field itself can be used to address organizational problems, such as
case overload. Since Brookline's 1979 condominium conversion morator-
ium and new permit system, landlords have applied in increasing numbers
for conversion permits. But the condominiums, if rented, were subject
to rent control. Therefore, the speculative market in condominiums as
rental property was dampened by rent control. But caseload data shows
conversion permits are rising annually, and with them the likelihood
of condominiums being used as rental income property. By removing
the growing number of Brookline condominiums from the regulatory
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umbrella, the Board has averted hearing numerous cases, and the staff
will be relieved of numerous, time consuming administrative steps for
rent adjustment petitions. The new bylaw also eliminates the possi-
bility of future caseload growth due to condominium rentals as a class.
Using a bylaw such as the April 30 condominium exemption is a
defensive use of rules defining the regulatory field. Future duties
cannot arise, and perhaps this step will help the organization "catch
up," at least from additional administrative tasks generated by Town
Meeting. The agency and Board did not initiate the bylaw, but both
will benefit from it in terms of organizational efficiency. Much
like the option of redefining the due process model, redefining the
regulatory field is one of the few possible choices available to
the organization for improving its efficiency.
CONCLUSION
Moderate rent control policy can be altered by all three kinds of
changes and administrative efficiency will improve: streamlining the
Due Process Model Proper, raising the GA, and redefining the regulatory
field. Each type of change reflects a different tool for affecting
organizational behavior, policy and practice. By (1) changing the
rules of administrative review, or (2) altering substantive policy,
or (3) legally redefining the regulatory field a rent control agency
can redistribute its caseload, improve administrative efficiency,
and redefine the equity relationship of landlords and tenants.
This thesis has argued that aspects of due process models of
administrative review provide opportunities for the most far reaching
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change, as a due process system of administrative review is a major
source of policy, and of both landlord and tenant property rights
under rent control. Moderate rent control policy and practice change
most significantly with changes made to the due process model in force.
As a Massachusetts judge wrote in the 1950's, tenant rights to rent
control protection are not vested rights.1 Therefore, it is at the
discretion of a rent control agency to fortify or reduce either landlord
or tenant rights. In choosing a particular due process model of
administrative review, Brookline chose to fortify tenant rights.
These due process protections gave tenants a toehold on residential
property rights, formerly enjoyed exclusively by their landlords.
But ten years of the Due Process Model proper has contributed to
such a heavy caseload, and to such time consuming duties for each
case, that the organization has moved far from its original
balancing goals, and now struggles with organizational dysfunction.
In the past, the organization has rejected mechanical formulae
to resolve such debates within the Board over who should pay such
costs as condominium ownership fees, debt service, higher taxes due
to reassessment, and fuel costs considered apart from conservation
efforts. The political nature of the problem was encouraged to come
to the fore on each case. The balancing of interests of landlords
and tenants was also encouraged, with many hearing opportunities,
staff inspections, and crosschecks.
But the balance attempted by Moderate Rent Control is an unstable
one. The role played by the Due Process Model Proper in achieving
that balance in the rights and levels of equity of landlords and tenants
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has not been compatible with rent control policy goals, nor with
organization survival. Inherent conflicts in a due process model,
especially in respect to the different handicaps imposed by time
on landlords and tenants as two distinct classes; and in respect
to the physical limitations of administrative staff in handling
ever increasing individual cases have produced the incompatibility.
The most likely possibilities available to Brookline's rent
control organization to improve its efficiency involve trimming
due process features in the system of administrative review.
Although trimming these features will reset the balance between
landlord and tenant economic interests, it will also reduce staff
workload. Tenants will find themselves paying closer and closer
to a market rent under rent control, which runs the risk of becoming
a minor price fixing agency, for adjustments will be based on general
market criteria. Landlords will begin to realize timely, and perhaps
generous adjustments by the Board to their FNOI levels, again due to
the Board reliance on more genera lized, less scrutinized data, and
due to fewer reviews of the competing interests.
The rent control organization is in a fortunate position because
it does have choices. A due process model is a flexible device and
can be gradually manipulated to improve organizational behavior.
The range of impacts for both the organization and the regulated which
we have sketched illustrate how inextricably moderate rent control
policy and practice are bound by a due process model. Rules of
administrative procedure are central in defining regulatory equity,
in defining a "fair" rent, and in insuring organizational survival.
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NOTES
1. See Chi.1, p .26.
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TABLE 1. Source: 7 Urban Lawyer 490
(1975).
Grounds for Invoking Rent Control.
1. Housing Shortage
cc U
E
0 .
U
0z
z 1z
xXXXXxXXOXXX
2. Rent Increases OXXOXXOXXXXX
3. Overcrowding OOXOOOOOOOOO
4. Serious Threat to Public
Health, Safety &
General Welfare XXXOXXOXXXXX
5. Evictions OOXOO OOO XO
6. Population Growth X OO O O O O O O OO X
7. Economic Conditions X O O X OO X X OO X X
8. Vacancy Rate X X O OO O O O O O X X
9. Disruption of Free
Housing Market X O OO O O 0 0 0 X X X
10. Tenant Hardship O X O O X O OO X X X X
11. Environmental Crisis 00 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0
12. Housing Demolition O OO OO O X O O O O O
13. Housing Deterioration O OO O OO O X O O O X
14. New Construction OO O O O O X OO X O
15. Cost of New Construction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 OX
16. War OO OOOO OXOXXX
17. Reduced Federal Subsidies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
X used this ground as a basis for the emergency.
0 = did not use this ground as a basis for the emergency.
Table: 2 Brookline Rent Control Board: Policy Additions
YEAR ADOPTED Nature of policy responsibility
1980 - Landlord short form energy improvement petition for energy
capital improvements, such as conversion from oil to gas, etc.
The Board added a 15% rate of interest onto the cost of the job.
Removal Permit requirement of condominium developers
to apply for permission to remove a unit from the rental stock.
Removal Permit also required (Article 39) for conversion of non-
controlled multi-family housing units.
Eviction protections extended to residents of cooperatives
renting cooperative units. Effective September, 1980.
Brookline Housing Conversion Board
GA adopted: 7.2% for oil heated buildings; 3.5% for gas heat
Filing fees of $5 per petition or application plus $1 per unit
covered by the petition or application initiated.
1979 - Parking fee per month increased $5 adopted
Emergency fuel general adjustment of 3.6%
Applicable to oil heated buildings only.
GA voted. First year in which two GA's voted(6.5%,oil; 4.4% gas)
Regulation 26, a revised depreciation schedule,
related improvements such as solar heating devices.
Short form capital improvement landlord petition abolished.
Interest rate allowable on improvements exceeding $ 2,500
reduced from 15% to 12%.
Board voted to conduct all of its business in open session.
Board voted a policy of allowing one representative of the
tenants to be present at a staff audit of a landlord petition
for rent adjustment.
Board voted to require owner occupants of condominiums currently
listed as rent-controlled units to apply for an exemption from
rent control.
Rent Control Board expanded from 7 to 9, two public interest
members being added to reduce the caseload which has increased.
15 8c
Table 2
YEAR ADOPTED
1978-
continued Brookline Rent Control Board: Policy Additions
Nature of Policy Responsibility
Staff reduced for FY 1979, although caseload increased from
calendar year 1977 to 1978, especially in regard to landlord
petitions for capital improvement related rent increases.
Special Town Meeting votes to restrict
of eviction by the Rent Control Board in condominium conversion
situations for a period of up to 12 months. Effective September,
1978.
Special Town Meeting votes to declare a moratorium on issuance
of certificates of eviction in condominium conversion situations.
Effective January, 1979.
GA issued of 4.1%.
Data processing functions transferred out of the Rent Control
Department to a newly created Information Services Department.
1977 - Computer registration techniques adopted.
GA announced of 5%.
Capital improvement policy for improvements financed with low
interest loans reduced the annual rate of return on unamortized
costs of the improvement from 15% to 6% with 3% financing.
Town begins year under its own rent control bylaw,Article XXXVIII.
Capital improvement policy allows 15% annual rate of return on the
unamortized cost of capital improvements exceeding $ 2,500.
GA voted of 5.7%
Staff increases by several members.
Selectman's Revenue and Rent Control Study Committee issues its
findings that rent control is not causing a shift in property
tax burden from one class of property owners to another. It
recommends that the Assessors and the Rent Control Board co-
ordinate their efforts in working towards common goals. Rent
Control Board votes to schedule hearings on properties referred
to it by the Assessor as filing for an abatement but not a rent
adjustment within the previous 12 months.
1976 -
1975 -
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Table 2
YEAR ADOPTED
1975 -
continued Brookline Rent Control Board:
Nature of Policy Responsibility
Capital improvement annual rate of return increased to 10% on
average unamortized cost of the capital improvement over its de-
preciable life.
TOWN ADOPTS ITS OWN RENT CONTROL BYLAW TO REPLACE THE STATE
CHAPTER 842 WHICH WAS DUE TO EXPIRE THAT YEAR. UNDER THE
AUTHORITY OF CHAPTER 843 (BROOKLINE RENT CONTROL ENABLING
ACT) THE SPECIAL TOWN MEETING BY AN ALMOST UNANIMOUS VOTE
VOTED TO ADOPT ARTICLE XXXVIII OF THE TOWN BYLAWS. IT BECAME
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 31, 1975.
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Brookline Rent Concrol Agency Adjustments
1970 through 1981
Pass
GA % Fuel Arli Taxz Th-renw~,h
Registra-:ion
3.6% jpcrease dver May
(29.6 fuel cost incre
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
asle
1979 re
times 1
2.6
3.0
1.4
5.7
5
4.1
6.5
4.4
6.5
oil
gas Yes1
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
nt for ftel cost ilnc
2% fuel rent ratio).
adjustmenit method.
buildiags
buildi Ags
rease Narczh 1978
Table 3 :
7.2 forloil heat-d
3.5 for gas heat d
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1.
-May,1979 ,oil.
2. See Table 8 or describtion of
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Table: 4 Brookline Rent Control Agency: Staff Load Data,
1970 through 1981. Totals represent cases filed.
FY #Cases Change Change
1982
3480 +432e
916c C-51 C
083 (967 ) +223
8 6 0c + 74
786 -60
846 +17
829 -85
914 -6
920 +200
720
NA: 6,106 units received
adjustment notices.
Registration.
arison o
r year c
ata.
on Janua
d on a ca
er, Fisca
oad: -1E
Data collection
refle ts a comp
year to calenda
Calendar year d
Estim te based
omput tion basE
decrea e. Howev
declind in casel
+47 e
-
5c
+26
+ 9
- 7
+ 2
- 9
-0.6
+27.7
rent
over frm a fiscal to
calenda] year fi 2ures
.culatiotI yields: +10
SourcErok 1-n"a TOX.n Anml
Staff
Changes
8 perman ent full time.
Staff reduction of 3,eff.7/1/81.
Added one clerk typist, /1/80.
10 permanent full time
same as 1976.
I same as 1976.
2 part time staff lost.
same as .4973.
same as 1973.
11 permanent full time;3 part time
Additional staff authorized.
Roger Lipson becomes Director-Counsel
9 permanent full time
Starting staff 3 full time,' and part
time as reeded.
I~_
a ca
to f
7, +1
981 month dat4, annualzed.
lendar y
1 year d
7, -15%.
1979
1979
calendz
calen&
ar year. This calculation
t1 1979 figures. A calenda
.n ca eload.
See Table
ar 1S80 would show a 5%
ar 1 80 shows a bigger
1981
2
1980
19791
19781
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
2. (
Fei
I
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Table: 5 Brookline Rent Control Agency: Calendar Year 1979 and 1980
Staff Load Report, selected data with 1981 annualized data.
Totals represent number filed.
Source: Brookline Rent Control Agency
1977-1977c a b
CASES: By Type 1978 1979 1980 1981 1981
Petitions
Landlord Total 151 188 176 17 204
Cap. Improvements 101 54 28
Rent Adjustments 50 134 148
Tenant 153 95 68 3 36
Evictions
Nonpayment 254 300 239 17 204
Except Nonpayment 182 272 148 32 384
Advisory Opinions 29 16 17 0 0
Removal Permits NA NA 89 35 480
Conversion Permits NA NA NA 20 240
TOTALS: 920 1,059 913 1,348b
a. One month only, available. See Table
b. If January figures are annualized.
c. Fiscal Year rather than calendar year.
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Table: 6 Brookline Rent Control Board, 1981, January only,
Cases Filed.
Source: Brookline Rent Control Agency
CASES: By Type
Petitions
Landlord
Tenant
Board initiated
Reallocation
Exemptions
Evictions
Nonpayment
Except nonpayment
Advisory Opinions
Parking Hearings
Removal Permits
Conversion Permits
TOTAL: ( for January, 1981)
# Filed
17
3
0
0
11
17
32
0
2
35
20
137 a
a : The 137 cases filed during January of 1981 represent more cases filed
for a one month period than in any month in 1980.
Table:
1,100
1.0001
1978-79 1979-80
a. - Higher than any single month total.
Jan.1981
Source: Brookline Rent
Control Staff
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Brookline Rent Control Board: Annual Totals,Caseload 1977-81,
Cases Filed and Cases Heard.
KEY:
C.
a. Filed for hearing totals
b. Heard
c. Total dealt with
b I
b.
900 -
800
700
a.
Cb
b
600
500.
400
300
200
-100
197 7-78
Table: 8
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Brookline Rent Control Board: 1971 General Adjustment-
Distribution of units by eligibility for maximum initial
General Adjustment.
Source: Lett, Rent Control, p. 1 7 1
Brookline Rent Control Board
Category
Class I
Class II
Number of Units
6,190
916
Class III 2,805
Definitions of Class Categories:
Class I : Includes all units receiving an adjustment to bring rent levels up to
25% above January 1, 1968 levels (the rollback date); and units re-
ceiving the 15% maximum adjustment.
Class II: Includes units which received no adjustment.
Class III: Includes units which had not filed the required information by the
initial agency deadline.
Total Units Eligible for 1971 GA Units Receiving GA
10,432 6,190 59.33
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Table: 9 Brookline Rent Control Board : Rent Increases
Granted, 1971-1974, by building size.
Source. Lett, Rent Control, p.164
Building Size in # Units: 20+ 5-19 1-4 All
Row 1
Weighted Average
Percent Increase Granted 7.6 7.8 9.5 8.4
Row 2
Number of Structures in Sample
Receiving an Increase 10 22 19 51
Row 3
Number of Units in Sample Re-
ceiving an Increase 295 196 58 549
Row 4
Percent of All Units Receiving
an Increase 53.7 35.7 10.6 100
Row 5
Total Un ts in City Receiving
Increase (Total Adjusted x Row $) 3,013 2,003 592 5,610
Row 6
Percent of Total Registered Units
Receiving Adjustment 59.8 38.1 59.2 49.6
Total Registered Units by Type 5,037 5,263 1,000 11,300
1. The total units adjusted figure was derived by multiplying the average units
per structure (10.30) from CUPR sample. This figure was confirmed as accur-
ate by the Brookline Rent Control Board.
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Table: 10 Brookline Rent Control Agency: Litigation Load
1970 through 1980.
Source: Roger Lipson
Dir.Brookline RC Agent
Reut Adj. Evictio Wris 1
Lawsuits
1970
1971
1972
1973
1975
1976
1977*
1978
1979
1980
* Note:
1. SourcE
77
106
83
44
23
33
insig.
insig.
Niles dec
: Selesni
209
144
103
83
ided,whi4h confired the p*inciple
ck, Rent Control.
f judicial review
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Table: 11 Brookline Rent Control Agency: Summary of
Litigation, 1973.
Source: Selesnick, Rent Control, p.55
Active Disposed of Pending
Brookline Municipal Court
Rent adjustment appeals
by Landlord
Rent adjustment appeals
by Tenant
Eviction appeals
Exemption appeals
Miscellaneous appeals
Other
Due Process
Superior Court
Rent adjustment appeals
by Landlord
Equity bills seeking
injunctive relief
Eviction appeals
Exemption appeals
Other
Appeals Court
Rent adjustment appeals
by Landlord
Supreme Judicial Court
Federal District Court
50(39)
3(3)
10(7)
2(3)
3(0)
9(3)
0(7)
14(2)
7(7)
2(2)
3(3)
1(1)
1(0)
1(1)
1(0)
21(11)
1(1)
7(6)
0(1)
2(0)
6(1)
0(7)
5(0)
2(4)
0(1)
1(0)
1(1)
29(28)
2(2)
3(1)
2(2)
1(0)
2(2)
0(0)
9(2)
5(6)
2(1)
2(2)
0(0)
1(0)
0(0)
0(0)
0(0)
1(0)
1(0)
with due process litigation accounting for
the total caseload. Rent adjustment ap-
caseload for 1972 and 1973.
Note: 1972 followed the same pattern,
a slightly higher percentage of
peals represent the bulk of the
Table: 12
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Comparison of Brookline Rent Control Agency to
Boston Rent Control Agency: Processing Time for
Rent Adjustments, 1981.
Source:(Based on Staff Member estimates)
BOSTON Days I
1. Petition:
14 - Landlord substantiates evidence on costs.
4 - Tenant may challenge data. Memorandtm prepared.
14 - Hearing scheduled. Findings prepared by staff.
7 - Hearing.
- Rent Control Board decision
Total: 60-90
2. GA:
7 - Landlord must verify Rent Control Agency data or
most recent maximtum legal rent.
7 - Landlordi must be registered to be eligible.
14 - Agency processing of verified forms.
Total: 30
BROOKLINE
Petition:
Total:
Days
10
7
7
14
7
7
30 - 90 days
Landlord
Hearing
Hearing
"Preheari
is prepar
"Analysis
for deter
Rearing (
officer a
transcrib
to "Prehe
"Post He
hearing
made to
Board Y
substant
officer p
officer i
ng Memora
ed; "Insp
of Retur
mining ne
if reques
nd one bo
ed into r
aring Mem
aring Mem
Memorand
full Ren
eeting to
iates 12 month cos
erforms audit.
aspects units in b
ndum" prepared; "A
ection Report" pre
nis" compares sever
t income figure an
ted),presided over
ard member; informa
emorandum form, an
orandum"
orandum" composed
uim" and testimony.
t Control Boardby
decide rent adjus
its.
uilding.
udit Repo
pared;
al criter
d fair re
by heari
l;taped;
d attache
rt"
ia
turr
ng
d
of "Pre
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Board membel
tment pet itic
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Table: 13 Westbrook Village: 1980 Data
Source: Boston Rent Control Agency files
Controlled Decontrolled
Total Number of Units: approximately 780
Brookline (2/3) 521 521 0
Boston (1/3) 259 184 75 (28.9%)
Addresses include both Brookline and Boston. The Westbrook Village complex
consists of identical one, two, and three bedroom units. It is managed by
the Niles Company, Inc. and has been for the period 1970 through 1980.
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Table: 14 Westbrook Village: Brookline
Brookline Rent Control Agency File
Correspondance:
Aug. 9, 1979
Facts:
Excerpts from
Letter writ-
ten by agency
Director,
Roger Lipson:
Brookline Rent Control Agency to Niles Company, Inc.
Re: Air Conditioning as a landlord provided service
Installation of air conditioning is not a landlord provided
service. The Brookline Rent Control Board's 1975 and 1976
decisions do not include air conditioning as a required ser-
vice in their determination of current maximum rents.
Registration statements do clearly show that electricity is
a service provided and is included in the maximum rents.
"Neither the registration statements nor the Board decisions
limit the provision of electricity to exclude power for
tenant installed air conditioners." Roger Lipson, Director
"The practice in effect at the time of the 1976 decision would
control what service is included in the maximum rents today.
It is my understanding that tenants were allowed at that time
to install their own air-conditioner units without objection
by the landlord."
"If that was the case, then the option of tenant air conitioner
installation must be a service included in the current maximum
rents. To force a tenant to remove an air conditioner in place
would certainly decrease the value of an apartment from the
tenant's perspective. Likewise, to refuse to permit a new in-
stallation by a tenant would diminish the value of that tenant's
apartment in comparison with other units where air conditioners
were already in place."
Table: 15
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Westbrook Village: Brookliae Units, 1968-1980.
Typical Rents and annual maximum legal rents,
for five different rent categories.
Source: Brookline Rent Control Agency
Address 1968 1970 11971(GA) 1972(GA) 1973(GA) 1974(P) 1975(GA) 1976(P) 1976(GA
#$Thornton Rd. $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $
1. 51 147 167 192 197 203 219 222 248 252
2. 17 165 178 205 211 217 227 230 256 260
3. 19 185 200 230 236 243 261 265 296 301
4. 65 205 220 253 260 268 261 265 296 301
5. 31 240 255 293 301 310 333 338 377 383
Total Total kverage Average
Incr./m. Incr./-m. Annual Annual
1968- 1970- Incr./m. Incr./m.
1977(P) 978(GA) 1979(FA) 980(GA) 1980 1980 10 yrs. 10 yrs.
265
273
316
316
402
(GA) =
(P ) =
(FA) =
276
284
329
329
418
286
294
341
341
433
305
313
363
363
461
158
148
178
158
221
1.07
.89
.96
.77
.92
General Adjustmejt, autom4tically granted.
Individtal Petiti
Fuel Adjustment,
See Table fc
on,acted on by thE
automati ally grar
r ammoun s.
10.7
8.9
9.6
7.7
9.2
15.80
14.80
17.80
15.80
22.10
Annual r4te diffeds.See Table
Rent Cortrol Boatd in a hoaring.
ted. Rat e depend on fuel type used.
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Table: 16
Wescbrook Village: 1979 and 1980 controlled rents.
Brookline and Boston units identical. Rents eT-Tect
five most frequent amounts in the spectrum charged.
Units
OOKLIN 1979 1980 Increase Increase Decontrolled: #
epen- $1
ce Dr. 1979 1980
286 305 19 .066 0 0
304 324 20 .065 0 0
321 342 21 .065 0 0
350 373 23 .065 0 0
433 461 28 .064 0 0
234
256
275
296
361
263
283
304
327
399
.123
.105
.105
.104
.105
Source: Brooklin
files.
and Bos on Rent ontrol Ajency
1 rEML
TON
pen-
.e Dr.
Ag~ncy
175
BIBLIOGRAPHY

176
Bibliography
Allan, G. J. "Some Perspectives on the Operation of the Rent Repeal Act
1973." 8 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 421 (1977).
Andrade, S. R. and R. F. Curran. "Towards a Definable Body of Legal
Requisites for Rent Control." 10 UCD Law Review 273.
Baar, K. K. and Keating, W. D. "The Last Stand of Economic Substantive
Due Process." 7 Urban Lawyer 447 (1975).
Bickel, Alexander M. The Morality of Consent. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1975.
Blau, Peter M. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1955.
Block, W. and Olsen, E., eds. Rent Control: Myths and Realities, Inter-
national Evidence of the Effects of Rent Control in Six Countries.
The Fraser Institute, 1981.
Blumberg, R. E., Robbins, B. Q. and Baar, K. K. "The Emergence of Second
Generation Rent Controls." 8 Clearinghouse Review 240 (1974-75).
Bolton, J. R. and Holzer, S. T. "Legal Services and Landlord-Tenant
Litigation: A Critical Analysis." 82 Yale Law Journal 1495 (1973).
Davis, Kenneth C. Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970.
Denman, D. R. The Place of Property: A New Recognition of the Function
and Form of Property Rights in Land. London: Geographical Publi-
cations Ltd., 1978.
Edelman, Murray. "Interest Representation and Policy Choice in Labor
Law Administration." Labor Law Journal 9 (1958), pp. 218-226.
--------. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1964.
Frame, A. and Harris, P. "Formal Rules and Informal Practices: a Study
of the New Zealand Rent Appeals Boards." New Zealand Universities
Law Review, vol. 17, no. 3 (19 ), pp. 213-236.
Friedman, L. M. "Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change." 19 Stan-
ford Law Review 786.
Galanter, M. "Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations of the Limits
of Legal Change." 9 Law and Society Review 95 (1974).
Gellhorn, Walter. When Americans Complain: Governmental Grievance Proce-
dures. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
177
Gilderbloom, J. Moderate Rent Control, The Experience of U.S. Cities,
Public Policy Report No. 3. Washington, D. C.: Conference on
Alternative, State and Local Policies, May, 1980.
Goldowitz, M. "Preparing for the Possibility of National Rent Control."
13 Clearinghouse Review 268 (1979).
Greenberger, Martin, Crenson, Matthew A. and Crissey, Brian L. Models in
the Policy Process. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976,
p. 49.
Handler, Joel F. "Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration."
In The Law of the Poor. Edited by Jacobus Ten Broek and the
editors of California Law Review. San Francisco: Chandler Pub-
lishing Co., 1966.
Hirschman, Albert 0. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in
Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1970.
Klein, J. H. "The Politics of Housing Dispute Resolution: An Academic
Perspective." 17 Urban Law Annual 353.
Koeppel, A. and Kramer, H. Z. "Property Tax Assessment: Contract Rent
Is Fair Market Rent, Or Is It?"' 2 Real Estate Law Journal 561
(1973-74).
Lett, M. R. Rent Control Concepts, Realities and Mechanisms. New
Brunswick: Rutgers University, 1976.
Levy, M. S. "Adjusting the Economic Relationship of Landlord and Tenant
-- Rent Alteration Remedies." 11 Urban Law Annual 155 (1976).
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Proceedings of Conference on Rent
Control: Its Effect on Housing Availability and Assessed Values.
Cambridge: Lincoln Institute Monograph # 77-1, October 25-26, 1976.
Lipsky, Michael. Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing and the
Power of the Poor. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970.
Perrow, Charles. Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View. Belmont,
California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1970.
Price, James L. Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Proposi-
tions. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968.
Reich, Charles. "The New Property." 73 YaleLaw Review (1964), 782.
Robson, P. and Watchman, P. "Determining Fair Rents." 128 New Law
Journal 1209 (1978).
Rubenstein, L. S. "Procedural Due Process and the Limits of the Adversary
System." 11 Harvard Civil Rights Law Review 48 (1976).
178
Schwartz, J. B. "Phase II Rent Stabilization." 4 Urban Lawyer 417 (1972).
Selesnick, H. L. Rent Control. Lexington: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath
and Company, 1976.
Travis, A. C. "Residential Rehabilitation and Rent Control: The Massachu-
setts Priority." 11 Urban Law Annual 319 (1976).
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited by
Talcot Parsons. London: The Free Press, 1964.
Willis, J. W. "A Short History of Rent Control Laws." 36 Cornell Law
Quarterly (1950-51) 54.
--------. "'Fair Rents' Systems." 16 George Washington Law Review 104
(1947-48).
--------. "The Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947." 47 Columbia Law
Review 1118 (1947).
Interviews
Buehler, George. Major landlord, Brookline, Massachusetts: Spring, 1981.
Hayashi, Waichiro. Former Hearing Examiner, Brookline Rent Control
Agency, Brookline, Massachusetts: Spring, 1981.
Hoey, Cheryl. Hearing Officer, Boston Rent Control Agency, Boston,
Massachusetts: Spring, 1981.
Katz, Estelle. Chairman, Brookline Rent Control Board, Brookline,
Massachusetts: Spring, 1981.
Lipson, Roger. Director-Counsel, Brookline Rent Control Agency, Brookline
Massachusetts: Spring, 1981.
Malone, Ray. Assistant Director, Boston Rent Control Agency, Boston,
Massachusetts: Spring, 1981.
Whittlesey, Robert. Former Court-appointed Master of Boston Housing
Authority, Master in leading case of Perez v. BHA, Boston,
Massachusetts: Spring, 1981.
179
